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ADVERSE INTERESTS AND ARTICLE III 
Ann Woolhandler 
ABSTRACT—In an important article in the Yale Law Journal, James 
Pfander and Daniel Birk claim that adverseness is not required by Article 
III for cases arising under federal law. This Article takes the position that 
Pfander and Birk have not made the case for reconsidering adversity 
requirements for Article III cases. Adverseness may be present when there 
is adversity of legal interests, even when adverse argument is not present. 
From this perspective, a number of Pfander and Birk’s examples of non-
contentious jurisdiction manifested adverseness. In rem-type proceedings 
such as bankruptcy and prize cases required the determination of adverse 
interests, in situations where impediments often existed to voluntary 
extrajudicial resolution. Service or notice in some form was generally 
provided, which gave opportunities for adverse argument. In addition, the 
issuance of warrants, while ex parte, involved adverse interests in a context 
where predeprivation notice would undermine the utility of the proceeding, 
notice occurred on execution of the warrant, and opportunity for argument 
was then often available. Pfander and Birk’s examples of pension and 
naturalization determinations are not as readily characterized as adverse. 
The Court, however, treated federal judges’ pension determinations as 
appropriate, if at all, as the work of individual commissioners rather than 
Article III judges. Naturalization petitions are perhaps Pfander and Birk’s 
best example of non-contentious jurisdiction, but the Court explicitly 
approved the practice as appropriate under Article III only after provisions 
for notice to, and potential appearance by, the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“In every court,” Blackstone wrote in 1768, “there must be at least 
three constituent parts, . . . : the actor, or plaintiff, who complains of an 
injury done; the reus, or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction 
for it; and the judex, or judicial power.”1 In 1800, Representative John 
Marshall interpreted the “Case[]”2 in Article III to incorporate a similar set 
of requirements: “[t]here must be parties to come to court, who can be 
reached by its process, and bound by its power; whose rights admit of 
ultimate decision by a tribunal to which they are bound to submit.”3 
1 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25; see also 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF
THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 39 (London 1628) (“[I]n everie Judgement there ought to 
be three persons, Actor, Reus, and Iudex.”); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1568 & n.29 (2002) (“For centuries, Anglo-American 
lawyers have thought that the very existence of most kinds of judicial proceedings depends upon the 
presence (actual or constructive) of adverse parties.”). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
3 The Honorable John Marshall, Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives, of the United 
States, on the Resolutions of the Hon. Edward Livingston, Relative to Thomas Nash, Alias Jonathan 
Robbins (March 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 96 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984) 
[hereinafter John Marshall Speech]; id. at 95 (“A case in law or equity . . . was a controversy between 
parties which had taken a shape for judicial decision.”). 
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Numerous Supreme Court decisions reiterate the need for parties with 
adverse interests who will be bound by the results of the litigation.4 
In addition, standing doctrine reflects the need for adverse interests 
that will be affected by the litigation. Standing requires not only a plaintiff 
who claims a legally cognizable interest that will be affected by the 
controversy but also a defendant who has in some sense caused injury to 
the plaintiff’s interests and can provide redress. The causation may consist 
in the defendant’s having an adverse legal interest that the plaintiff seeks to 
diminish or transfer to himself rather than that the defendant necessarily 
has disturbed the status quo.5 Under existing doctrine, though, the fact that 
Congress or a state legislature is willing to treat the parties as having 
sufficient adverse interests does not automatically make it so.6 
While several scholars have defended adversity as an Article III 
requirement and criticized certain types of proceedings as failing to meet 
it,7 the adversity requirement also has its critics.8 In an impressive article in 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 46 (1852) (indicating that certain 
determinations of treaty claims were not cases because, inter alia, the United States was not authorized 
to appear as a party to oppose the claim); Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325, 330 (1885) (“[N]o court sits 
to determine questions of law in thesi. There must be a litigation upon actual transactions between real 
parties, growing out of a controversy affecting legal or equitable rights as to person or property.”); 
California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893) (“The duty of this court, as of 
every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or of property, which are actually 
controverted in the particular case before it.”); United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 588 (1899) 
(determining that the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia could review the decision of the 
Commissioner of Patents, and stating that “the proceeding in the Court of Appeals on an appeal in an 
interference controversy presents all the features of a civil case, a plaintiff, a defendant and a judge”); 
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (stating that judicial power “is the right to 
determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper 
jurisdiction”); see also id. at 357 (indicating that a case requires “the existence of present or possible 
adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication” (quoting In re Pac. Ry. 
Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887))). 
5 See, e.g., HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§ 192–195 (2d 
ed. 1948) (describing actions to quiet title and to remove a cloud on title); id. § 194, at 523 (“Where 
adverse possession has given title to the land, the adverse possessor may maintain the suit . . . [to quiet 
title] against the holder of record title.”). 
6 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992) (rejecting the argument that “the injury-
in-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-
contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law”); 
Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 360–63 (dismissing a suit that Congress explicitly authorized to contest the 
constitutionality of a congressional statute); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883) 
(dismissing claims where state legislation authorized the state to sue on behalf of citizens holding bonds 
of another state, stating that “one State cannot create a controversy with another State, within the 
meaning of that term as used in the judicial clauses of the Constitution, by assuming the prosecution of 
debts owing by the other State to its citizens”). 
7 See, e.g., Ralph E. Avery, Article III and Title 11: A Constitutional Collision, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 
397, 400 (1996) (arguing that some of the main elements of the bankruptcy code do not comply with 
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the Yale Law Journal, James Pfander and Daniel Birk claim that 
adverseness is not required by Article III for “Cases” under federal law.9 
Article III’s case or controversy requirement); Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent 
of the Government? The Problems with Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 637, 644–46 (2014) (criticizing consent decree practice as failing to satisfy adversity, and 
recommending in government–defendant cases that the plaintiff be required to show an entitlement to 
relief and that the remedy is necessary to redress the particular violation); id. at 641 n.16 (collecting 
scholarship on consent decrees); Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, 
the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
545, 548–51 (2006) (providing historical and normative support for an adversity requirement, and 
arguing that settlement class actions do not conform to this requirement because they are not adversary 
at the time of filing); id. at 580 (arguing that if a case is adverse in the beginning, there is more 
assurance that it was not brought primarily to bind future litigants); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 85–88 (1969) (raising lack of adversity problems with surveillance 
warrants). Redish and Kastanek provide a detailed normative rationale for an adversity requirement, see 
Redish & Kastanek, supra, at 570–88, which this Article does not purport to provide. 
8 There are numerous critiques of standing doctrine, and particularly the requirement of injury in 
fact. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article 
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). Related to standing requirements is mootness doctrine, which 
purports to require that the parties maintain an adequate stake throughout the litigation, not just at the 
outset. See infra note 139. Because the Court has sometimes applied mootness doctrine loosely, many 
articles take the position that mootness is subconstitutional. See, e.g., Matthew I. Hall, The Partially 
Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 565–66 (2009) (arguing, based on 
review of cases, that there is “personal stake mootness” and “issue mootness,” and only the latter is of 
constitutional magnitude); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of 
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 609–10, 609 nn. 22–23, 610 n.24, 668 (1992) (arguing that the 
Court’s mootness doctrine should be seen as subconstitutional, and casting doubt on the constitutional 
status of justiciability doctrines generally); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by 
Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 247, 305–06 (1988) (arguing that a traditional personal stake should not be a constitutional 
requirement in actions for a deterrent remedy). This Article does not address the range of standing and 
mootness critiques. 
9 James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, 
and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1357 (2015). In addition, Professor Pfander has 
coauthored several related articles. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & Emily K. Damrau, A Non-Contentious 
Account of Article III’s Domestic Relations Exception, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117, 118–21, 145–46, 
163–65 (2016) (arguing that federal courts should be able to handle uncontested domestic relations 
matters if they arise as federal question cases rather than diversity controversies, and could handle 
contested domestic relations matters under diversity jurisdiction); James E. Pfander & Michael J.T. 
Downey, In Search of the Probate Exception, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1533, 1538–39, 1551, 1556, 1579 
(2014) (making a similar claim as to probate matters). Professor Pfander and his coauthors argue that 
federal law “Cases” differ from diversity “Controversies” in that only the latter require adversity. See, 
e.g., Pfander & Birk, supra, at 1357, 1424, 1442; Pfander & Downey, supra, at 1538–39; see also
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal
Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 449–50, 519 (1994) (arguing that, under the original meaning of
Article III, law exposition is the role of the federal courts in cases, while controversies focus on bilateral
disputes); id. at 450 (arguing that the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness are not
constitutionally required as to cases). Many scholars see cases as encompassing both civil and criminal
proceedings, while controversies include only civil proceedings. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203,
220 (1997); Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1575
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They rely on a statement by Chief Justice John Marshall, as well as a 
similar statement by Justice Joseph Story, that federal courts may exercise 
jurisdiction over cases “when the subject is submitted to it by a party who 
asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.”10 The authors also provide 
(1990). But cf. David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 
1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 149 n.278 (finding evidence insufficient for a case/controversy distinction either 
as to criminal/civil or as to law declaration/dispute resolution); Michael T. Morley, Non-Contentious 
Jurisdiction and Consent Decrees, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 14 (2016) (arguing that the Constitution 
uses “cases” and “controversies” interchangeably). 
  Pfander and Birk argue that this Article fails to grapple with their distinction between diversity 
controversies, which would require adversity, and federal cases. James E. Pfander & Daniel Birk, 
Adverse Interests and Article III: A Reply, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1085–88 (2017) [hereinafter 
Pfander & Birk Reply]. To the extent that this Article shows that many of the federal question 
proceedings that the authors rely on as originally non-contentious—e.g., bankruptcy, prize, remissions, 
and warrants—were in fact adverse, the result renders questionable the purported case/controversy 
distinction that the authors seek to support. Cf. John Marshall Speech, supra note 3, at 95 (“A case in 
law or equity was a term well understood, and of limited signification. It was a controversy between 
parties which had taken a shape for judicial decision. If the judicial power extended to every question 
under the constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and 
decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve almost 
every subject on which the executive could act.”); infra note 18 & Section II.A (indicating federal 
bankruptcy and diversity receiverships were treated comparably); infra note 119 (noting comparable 
treatment of diversity and federal question shareholder actions). 
10 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1419, 1442, 1453 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824)). Taken in context, there is nothing in the quoted statements from 
Chief Justice Marshall or Justice Story that is inconsistent with an adverse party requirement. Chief 
Justice Marshall’s statement was in the context of an adversarial dispute, and he gave an example 
shortly after the above quoted language: “The suit of The Bank of the United States v. Osborn and 
others, is a case, and the question is, whether it arises under a law of the United States?” Osborn, 
22 U.S. at 819. The lack of inconsistency of the language quoted by Pfander and Birk with an adversity 
requirement for cases is further shown in Marshall’s 1800 speech in the House of Representatives in 
which he noted the need for adversity. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. That statement was 
immediately preceded by a statement similar to Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Osborn that a case 
requires that a party “assert[] his rights in the form prescribed by law.” 22 U.S. at 819. Marshall 
explained, 
By extending the judicial power to all cases in law and equity, the constitution had never been 
understood, to confer on that department, any political power whatever. To come within this 
description, a question must assume a legal form, for forensic litigation, and judicial decision. 
There must be parties to come into court, who can be reached by its process, and bound by its 
power; whose rights admit of ultimate decision by a tribunal to which they are bound to submit. 
John Marshall Speech, supra note 3, at 95–96 (emphasis added). But cf. Pfander & Birk Reply, supra 
note 9, at 1069–70 & nn.10–11 (suggesting that Marshall’s statements as a representative should be 
discounted in light of Marshall’s statement as a judge in Osborn); id. at 1070 (claiming that this Article 
prefers “revisions of the Gilded Age to the choices of the Framers”). 
 The authors also rely on Justice Story’s statement, “A case, then, in the sense of this clause of the 
constitution, arises when some subject touching the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States is 
submitted to the courts by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.” Pfander & Birk, 
supra note 9, at 1419 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 1646, at 424 (photo. reprint 2005) (2d ed. 1851)). Justice Story cited, inter alia, 
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numerous examples of what they call “non-contentious jurisdiction” in the 
federal courts—essentially, instances when courts determine issues ex 
parte. 
After presenting their enumeration of non-contentious cases, Pfander 
and Birk divide their examples into two categories: ancillary and original 
non-contentious cases. The first category comprises “non-contentious 
features . . . that are ancillary to an actual or potential dispute.”11 Their 
ancillary category includes default judgments, consent decrees, and guilty 
pleas.12 Given that these matters “arise in connection with a dispute 
between actual or potential adversaries,”13 examples in the ancillary 
category would not seem significantly to undermine an adversity 
requirement.14 Their second category, “actions that are originally non-
contentious,”15 presumably poses a greater threat to the adversity 
requirement. The authors include in this category prize jurisdiction,16 
remissions of fines,17 bankruptcies and equity receiverships,18 warrants,19 
and benefits determinations such as petitions for pensions20 and for 
citizenship.21 
Osborn to support the proposition. STORY, supra, § 1646, at 424 n.2. As is true for Marshall’s similar 
language, the Story quotation is not inconsistent with an adversity requirement. 
11 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1440. 
12 Id. at 1441. 
13 Id. 
14 See id. at 1442–43 (indicating that courts can exercise ancillary non-contentious jurisdiction even 
in diversity controversies). As noted infra text accompanying note 33, no one contends that 
adversariness must pervade all issues in a lawsuit. This Article, therefore, does not focus on Pfander and 
Birk’s examples of ancillary non-contentious jurisdiction. 
15 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1440. 
16 Id. at 1446. 
17 Id. at 1445. 
18 Id. at 1441 & n.445. In later work, Pfander treats receiverships as in the ancillary category. See 
Pfander & Damrau, supra note 9, at 145–46. This is perhaps because equity receiverships were under 
the diversity jurisdiction, see infra note 123 and accompanying text, which Pfander and his coauthors 
treat as requiring contention. See supra note 9. Pfander and Birk may be suggesting that it is the 
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings as well as equity receiverships that is non-contentious. See Pfander 
& Birk, supra note 9, at 1441 (“In still other contexts, the party claims a right to invocation of 
administrative or judicial machinery for the disposition of an estate, as in bankruptcy or the 
appointment of an equity receiver.”). If “originally non-contentious” merely means that the actions 
begin without personal service on an adverse party who will nevertheless receive some form of service 
or notice thereafter, then even original non-contentious proceedings do not present a serious challenge 
to adversity requirements. 
19 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1441. 
20 Id. at 1361, 1364 (including pensions in the category of government benefits); id. at 1440–41 
(including claims for entitlements to a benefit as original non-contentious proceedings). 
21 Id. at 1441, 1447. 
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In addition to providing examples and categories of non-contentious 
cases, Pfander and Birk minimize the apparent importance of cases in 
which the Court seemingly required adverseness. They argue that the 
Court’s hostility to collusive cases was primarily directed against 
“collusive proceedings that assume the form of contentious ones,” such as 
where friendly parties attempted to obtain decisions that would prejudice 
the rights of nonparties, or attempted to elicit constitutional precedent.22 
Pfander and Birk argue that the Court’s criticism of such proceedings did 
not manifest a broader requirement of adverseness.23 Similarly, they argue 
that federal judges’ apparent hostility to hearing ex parte pension 
applications, as manifested in Hayburn’s Case,24 was principally directed 
against political branch review of judicial decisions rather than to the lack 
of adverseness.25 
Pfander and Birk ultimately claim that we should expand our notions 
of what constitutes a case to include non-contentious proceedings.26 Thus, 
in line with others who cast doubts on the Court’s justiciability doctrines,27 
they would ultimately give more power to Congress to expand federal court 
jurisdiction.28 
This Article takes the position that Pfander and Birk, while having 
significantly contributed to scholars’ appreciation of the many ex parte 
matters handled by the federal courts, have not made the case for 
reconsidering adversity requirements for Article III cases.29 This Article 
addresses Pfander and Birk’s principal historical examples of original non-
22 See id. at 1433. 
23 Id. (“[T]he decisions that restrict the use of collusive cases do not actually question the power of 
the federal courts to hear non-contentious proceedings in general, but only collusive proceedings that 
assume the form of contentious ones.”). 
24 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
25 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1432. 
26 Id. at 1357, 1473. 
27 Sunstein, supra note 8, at 235–36. 
28 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1473–74. Their most tangible result would be to give Congress 
greater leeway to assign to Article III courts the determination of ex parte claims, such as uncontested 
determinations of benefits. See id. at 1449–50. As to constitutional cases, they seem to think contention 
is preferable but not constitutionally required. See id. at 1455. 
29 Professor Morley has also written a reply to Pfander and Birk, arguing that “for a case or 
controversy to exist, the interested parties must not have . . . reached an affirmative agreement on all 
issues.” Morley, supra note 9, at 3. Unlike this Article, Professor Morley does not dispute Pfander and 
Birk’s historical evidence. See id. at 2. Rather, he claims that early Court practice is a “surprisingly 
unreliable guide in interpreting Article III.” Id. at 4–8 (providing examples). He is particularly 
concerned with establishing that many consent decrees raise serious Article III concerns, as he argued 
in his prior Article, see Morley, supra note 7, and that this is true even under the framework proposed 
by Pfander and Birk. Morley, supra note 9, at 3, 9. 
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contentious jurisdiction including in rem-type proceedings such as 
bankruptcies, equity receiverships, prize, and remission of fines; warrants; 
and benefits determinations such as petitions for pensions and citizenship. 
In addition, the Article responds to Pfander and Birk’s arguments that the 
Court’s hostility to collusive proceedings was of limited significance and 
that Court’s resistance to pension cases should be seen as focused on 
political branch review. 
Part I defines the adversity requirement as a requirement of adversity 
of legal interests rather than necessarily adversity of legal arguments. As is 
evident in default judgments, unopposed transfers of legal interests are not 
necessarily voluntary transfers,30 and judgments are often required for such 
transfers whether or not adverse parties appear. Multilateral claims upon 
limited assets face additional hurdles to voluntary extrajudicial resolution. 
Part II shows that in rem-type proceedings involved adverse legal interests 
and often evoked adverse argument. Part III considers warrants, where the 
utility of the procedure would be lost by pre-deprivation notice, and later 
opportunity for adverse arguments was generally available, at least as an 
historical matter. Part IV discusses how judicial hostility to collusive 
proceedings should not be read so narrowly as Pfander and Birk contend. 
Part V addresses pensions and naturalization. As to pensions, the evidence 
does not support treating judges’ objections to pension work as focused 
only on nonjudicial review. Such pension work as the judges performed, 
moreover, was done as commissioners. Naturalization is perhaps the 
authors’ best example of a non-contentious proceeding, but the Court only 
explicitly approved the practice as within Article III after amendments to 
the statutes provided notice and opportunity to be heard in the United 
States. 
I. DISTINGUISHING ADVERSE LEGAL INTERESTS
AND ADVERSE ADVOCACY 
A. Adverse Interests and Adverse Arguments
In evaluating whether adverseness is required by Article III, one 
should distinguish two aspects of adverseness. One is a requirement of 
adverse legal interests that will be affected by a decree. Another is a 
requirement of adverse advocacy interests or adverse legal arguments. A 
prototypical case involves some issues as to which the parties have both 
adverse legal interests as well as adverse arguments. Adverse legal 
30 See Morley, supra note 9, at 10 (“Thus, a meaningful distinction exists between mere lack of 
opposition and affirmative consent.”). 
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arguments, however, are clearly not sufficient for a case, nor are they 
always necessary. By contrast, adverse legal interests are necessary and 
often sufficient. The most plausible version of the adverseness requirement 
is that a case requires a clash of legal interests but does not always require a 
clash of argument.31 
B. Involuntary Termination of Legal Interests Often Requires a Judgment
To tease out why having adverse interests—but not adverse
arguments—is a requirement for a case, consider two of Pfander and Birk’s 
examples of non-contentious proceedings: defaults and bankruptcy.32 The 
characteristics of defaults and bankruptcies will reappear in other examples 
of supposed non-contentious proceedings and illustrate the need for adverse 
legal interests even if adverse argument might be dispensable. 
Even in a typical bilateral case with adverse legal interests and 
arguments, no one would claim that the parties must make adverse legal 
arguments on all issues. Indeed, both older pleading practices and modern 
procedure have encouraged the narrowing of issues.33 But what if the 
parties, at least as far as the court is concerned, apparently disagree about 
nothing? For example, in an ordinary contract dispute in which a creditor 
sues a debtor, the debtor may have no defense. If the creditor sues the 
debtor and the debtor is served, the debtor may default34 or agree to entry of 
a consent judgment. If the defendant is not prepared to defend, why don’t 
the parties merely arrange their affairs contractually without a lawsuit?35 
31 This formulation is Caleb Nelson’s. Caleb Nelson, Commentary on James Pfander’s The 
Contested History of Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, at the Hugh and Hazel Darling 
Foundation Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference, University of San Diego School of Law (Feb. 
20–21, 2015), http://www.sandiego.edu/law/centers/csco/webcasts/2015.php [https://perma.cc/2P2K-
XK3F]; cf. Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend 
Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907, 912–13 (2011) (noting the frequency of 
Supreme Court cases in which only one party appeared before the Court prior to 1954). 
32 Pfander and Birk characterize defaults as ancillary non-contentious proceedings and characterize 
bankruptcies as original non-contentious proceedings. Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1440–41; cf. id. 
at 1371 (stating that bankruptcy “has long featured a combination of both adverse and non-adverse 
proceedings”). As noted above, Pfander and Birk’s category of ancillary non-contentious proceedings 
presents less of a challenge to adversity requirements than original non-contentious proceedings. See 
supra note 14 and accompanying text. To the extent that in rem-type proceedings such as bankruptcies 
(original) exhibit similar characteristics to defaults (ancillary), such original non-contentious 
proceedings also do not present a significant challenge to Article III adversity requirements. 
33 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(C) (indicating that the pretrial conference should consider 
“obtaining admissions and stipulations about facts and documents to avoid unnecessary proof”). 
34 Cf. Nelson, supra note 1, at 1569–72 (discussing historical support for the necessity of acquiring 
jurisdiction over the defendant, and the development of default and attachment proceedings). 
35 Cf. Redish & Kastanek, supra note 7, at 577 (suggesting that if the parties come to a court in 
agreement, they have no need for a judgment rather than a contract unless they are trying to bind third 
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Among other reasons, the debtor may lack any hard-edged compulsion 
to surrender his legal interests and admit liability without a lawsuit.36 Even 
lacking a defense to a contract claim, the debtor will not necessarily 
voluntarily make himself amenable to the equivalent of judgment 
enforcement. For example, he may not hand over a portion of his wages 
that would be subject to garnishment in the event of a judgment.37 
Consider, too, a multilateral dispute in which a distressed debtor has 
multiple creditors. Creditors may be unwilling voluntarily to give up their 
claims without the compulsion of legal proceedings, even if they have little 
chance of receiving satisfaction.38 Nonjudicial, contractual solutions are 
further complicated when the insolvent debtor has numerous creditors 
whose interests in any remaining assets of the debtor would best be 
adjusted simultaneously.39 This scenario for bankruptcy is typical of 
limited-fund and in rem proceedings (collectively referred to herein as in 
rem-type proceedings), which are familiar to the law of civil procedure.40 
Such in rem-type proceedings necessarily include the potential for a 
form of default, just as in personam actions do. Despite provisions for 
parties). While some jurisdictions require “demand letters,” particularly in contract claims, as a 
prerequisite to suit, a plaintiff generally is not required to show an attempt at voluntary agreement as a 
precondition to filing suit. 
36 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility in the Law of Torts, 
in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 251, 265–66 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012) (indicating 
that the obligation to provide redress in tort law arises from a power given to the victim to impose a 
liability on the defendant that is distinguishable from the primary right not to be injured and the 
defendant’s duty not to injure). A contractual obligation generally entails a duty to satisfy the contract 
without a judgment, but a party nevertheless may decline, or be unable, to perform. 
37 Obtaining a judgment will also establish priority over other later judgments. Priority can 
sometimes be established contractually through grant of a security interest. Sometimes one cannot 
establish priority contractually. For example, there are restrictions on the assignment of wages. 
38 In addition, loan forgiveness may lead to unfavorable tax consequences for the debtor. See, e.g., 
26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (2012). 
39 See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of 
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 106 (1984) (“Bankruptcy law, at bottom, is designed to require these investors to 
act collectively rather than to take individual actions that are not in the interests of the investors as a 
group.”). 
40 Cf. Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State 
Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 296 (2009) (concluding that among small businesses, the use of federal 
bankruptcy as opposed to state procedures—such as assignments for the benefit of creditors—results 
from “bargaining failure between the business and its senior lenders”); id. at 259 (indicating that the 
functions traditionally assigned to bankruptcy are “remedying collective action and other coordination 
problems”). 
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notice,41 some or all creditors might decline to file claims, based on their 
view of costs and benefits.42 Indeed, parties who did not receive notice but 
as to whom reasonable notice was attempted under existing procedural due 
process requirements may have their interests altered in the bankruptcy 
proceeding given the perceived need to resolve claims to the estate in one 
proceeding.43 
Both when a debtor defaults in a suit by a creditor and when a creditor 
fails to make a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, an unopposed transfer of 
legal interests is not necessarily the same thing as a voluntary transfer.44 
Securing an unconsented transfer of legal interests often requires a 
judgment. A valid judgment will require notice comporting with existing 
procedural due process requirements. Ordinary defaults and bankruptcy 
proceedings thus share the following characteristics: (1) a need to make a 
conclusive determination of adverse legal interests that cannot readily be 
accomplished by voluntary extrajudicial action, (2) requirements of notice 
comporting with procedural due process requirements, and (3) the ability to 
make a conclusive determination, even if the owners of opposing interests 
fail to appear to make adverse arguments.45 
41 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002 (listing rules for notice to creditors and others); FED. R. BANKR. P.
2002(l) (providing publication notice if notice by mail is not feasible); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (2012) 
(providing that unscheduled debts are not generally discharged). 
42 See Morley, supra note 7, at 671 (stating that in uncontested bankruptcies, as in defaults, the 
“underlying adverseness is not eliminated by the fact that a creditor might not find it economically 
worthwhile to contest”); cf. Redish & Kastanek, supra note 7, at 587 n.157 (arguing that because 
creditors are always potential adversaries in bankruptcy, an advance determination of adversariness may 
be impossible). In addition, creditors do not have to file a proof of claim if the debtor is in Chapter 11 
and the debt is not disputed, contingent, or unliquidated. See § 501(a); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c). 
43 In certain mass tort bankruptcies, the plans purport to alter the rights of people whose injuries 
have not yet manifested themselves. The bankruptcy court will appoint a representative for future 
claimants. See Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 
1576–77, 1576 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995) (discussing different tests courts have used to determine if future 
claimants have cognizable claims); § 524(g)–(h) (providing that plans may include trusts for future 
asbestos claimants, and that courts may appoint a representative). 
44 See Morley, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that lack of opposition and consent are not the same); id. 
(arguing that in some of Pfander and Birk’s examples, “the whole reason that litigation exists in the first 
place is because the opposing party will not consent to the relief the plaintiff seeks”). 
45 While Pfander and Birk claim that this Article provides no criteria for applying its adverse 
interest requirements, see Pfander & Birk Reply, supra note 9, at 1085–88, this Article suggests that 
disputes that proceed ex parte tend to share the characteristics of defaults and in rem-type proceedings 
noted above. Warrants have similar characteristics of a need to affect adverse interests that cannot 
easily be adjusted by agreement, and requirements of notice comporting with procedural due process. 
See infra text accompanying notes 83–85. Pfander and Birk suggest that the lack of actual notice to the 
affected parties in some prize cases undermines the coherency of this account. See Pfander & Birk 
Reply, supra note 9, at 1086. Notice that complies with procedural due process, however, may of course 
fail to give actual notice. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 
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II. IN REM AND LIMITED-FUND PROCEEDINGS
Pfander and Birk give several in rem-type proceedings as examples of 
original non-contentious proceedings: bankruptcies, receiverships, prize 
cases, and remissions of forfeitures. All of these proceedings share with 
defaults the characteristics noted above and do not undermine an 
adverseness requirement. 
A. Bankruptcy and Equity Receiverships
Pfander and Birk treat bankruptcy and equity receiverships as original 
non-contentious proceedings in the federal courts; bankruptcy has been 
addressed in Part I. Federal bankruptcy statutes, however, were short-lived 
before 1898, and larger corporations did not frequently use the bankruptcy 
statutes prior to certain enactments in the late 1930s.46 Before then, federal 
court equity receiverships served as a vehicle for corporate reorganizations 
of their debt structure.47 Both bankruptcy and equity receiverships required 
notice to those with potential claims;48 they also manifested the need for, 
and the ability of the court to make, a conclusive determination even if 
adverse parties do not appear. 
B. Prize Jurisdiction
Prize jurisdiction in admiralty has similar characteristics: the need for 
a resolution, notice comporting with due process, and the ability to enter a 
final decree even absent the appearance of those with adverse interests. The 
laws of war traditionally allowed, during hostilities, the seizure of enemy 
(1950). That cases involving adverse interests may proceed even absent adverse parties results from the 
perceived necessity of making a determination, rather than from the desirability of ex parte proceedings. 
46 DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 3–4 
(2001) (noting that bankruptcy laws enacted in 1800, 1841, and 1867 were short-lived, but that the 1898 
law had “staying power”); id. at 48 (indicating that while the Act of 1867, after an 1874 amendment, as 
well as the 1898 Act, included corporate bankruptcy, those acts were rarely used by large corporations). 
47 See id. at 101 (indicating that the Chandler Act of 1938 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 
brought more corporate insolvency and reorganization proceedings under the federal statute, and 
“decimated existing [corporate] reorganization practice”); id. at 125–27 (indicating that corporations 
eventually would turn to Chapter 11 reorganization to allow managers to retain control of the 
corporation). 
48 See James Byrne, The Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages in the United States Courts, in SOME
LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 77, 96 (1917) 
(indicating that as part of the receivership order, or immediately thereafter, orders were entered, inter 
alia, “requiring all creditors to present claims to a designated master before a fixed date; and directing 
that notice be published in certain newspapers; that a copy of the order be mailed to creditors who are 
on the books of the company; that any creditor be allowed to object to the claim of any other creditor; 
and that a hearing be had before the master on the date fixed in the order or on such other date as the 
master may name”). 
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armed vessels as well as enemy commercial ships and cargo.49 In addition, 
American and neutral ships could be subject to seizure for violating the 
nonintercourse laws and American embargoes.50 When the seizing party, 
whether a government officer or a privateer, brought the vessel into port, 
the determination of interests typically proceeded by libel as part of the 
prize jurisdiction of the federal courts.51 
Such libel proceedings are in rem52 and adjudicate conflicting legal 
interests among claimants to particular property, similar to bankruptcy. 
Parties with claims on the vessel and cargo are potentially adverse to one 
another. To be sure, in prize cases, the parties were characterized 
differently than in an in personam suit. At least as a formal matter, the 
seized ship was the defendant.53 Service was on the ship; “when the 
49 RUFUS WAPLES, A TREATISE ON PROCEEDINGS IN REM § 292, at 394 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 
1882) (“The general rule is that belligerents have a right to make prize of each other’s property found 
upon the high seas; and to this rule there are but few exceptions.”). 
50 See, e.g., 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–1815, at 409–10 (1981) 
(indicating that forfeitures under the Non-Intercourse Acts, enacted from 1798 through 1800 during the 
“Quasi-War” with France, were primarily imposed on residents of the United States); Act of Apr. 18, 
1806, ch. 29, § 1, 2 Stat. 379, 379 (prohibiting generally the importation of certain goods from Great 
Britain, Ireland, and the British colonies); Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, § 1, 2 Stat. 451, 451–52 (placing 
an embargo on all ships within the United States bound for any foreign place, although allowing 
departure of foreign vessels when notified of the Act); Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, ch. 24, § 1, 2 Stat. 
528, 528 (interdicting British and French vessels from the territory of the United States); id. § 2, 2 Stat. 
at 528–29 (forbidding citizens and residents of the United States from intercourse with such vessels); id. 
§ 4, 2 Stat. at 529 (forbidding importation from France and Great Britain, with certain exceptions for
American vessels). 
51 See ERASTUS C. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY: ITS JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE, 
§§ 510–511, at 282–83 (photo. reprint 2009) (1850) (discussing the requirement that the captor
immediately give notice to the commissioner or judge when the captor came into port, and turn over all
documents, and that the captor must produce one or more of the persons captured as witnesses whose
depositions with the ship’s papers were sealed and transmitted to the clerk of court).
52 See, e.g., Jennings v. Carson, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 2, 23 (1807) (“The proceedings of [admiralty] 
court are in rem, and their sentences act on the thing itself.”); BENEDICT, supra note 51, § 359, at 201–
02; see also Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2467 (2016) 
(discussing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827), an in rem forfeiture proceeding). Damages 
actions for captures without probable cause, however, were in personam. See BENEDICT, supra note 51, 
§ 362, at 202–03; id. § 509, at 282.
53 See Jennings, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 24 (characterizing the proceedings as against the ship);
WAPLES, supra note 49, § 1, at 2 (stating that proceedings in rem treat property “as the defendant, 
susceptible of being tried and condemned, while the owner merely gets notice, along with the rest of the 
world, and may appear for his property or not”); cf. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND 
MARITIME LAW § 1-2, at 9 (5th ed. 2012) (indicating that current in rem admiralty actions continue to 
personify the vessel). 
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proceeding is against a ship, the process commences with a warrant 
directing the arrest of the ship.”54 There was also notice by publication.55 
Because the ship was deemed the defendant, both the captors and 
other claimants were the actors or plaintiffs and could initiate 
proceedings,56 and all were seen as adverse to one another. Indeed, the 
entire world was deemed adverse. Justice Story adverted to the binding 
nature of in rem forfeiture on the world, and stated, “The reasonableness of 
this doctrine results from the very nature of proceedings in rem. All persons 
having an interest in the subject matter, whether as seizing officers, or 
informers, or claimants, are parties or may be parties to such suits, so far as 
their interest extends.”57 
54 Jennings, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 24 (citing 2 ARTHUR BROWNE, A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE
CIVIL LAW, AND OF THE LAW OF THE ADMIRALTY 397 (1802)); see also BENEDICT, supra note 51, 
§ 365, at 204 (stating that notice is necessary to bind individuals, and that in proceedings in rem “notice
is served upon the thing itself”); WAPLES, supra note 49, § 42, at 54 (“What citation is, in a personal
civil action, seizure is in the actio in rem, so far as it is notice to all interested.”); id. § 65, at 89
(indicating that seizure is sufficient notice to owners, based on the presumption “that every man knows
whether his lands are in the adverse possession of another”); cf. Rule IX, Rules of Practice of the Courts
of the United States in Causes of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction, 44 U.S. (3 How.) i, v (1845) (“In
all cases of seizure and in other suits and proceedings in rem, the process, unless otherwise provided for
by statute, shall be by a warrant of arrest of the ship, goods or other thing to be arrested, and the
marshal . . . shall cause public notice thereof and of the time assigned for the return of such process and
the hearing of the cause to be given in such newspaper within the district as the District Court shall
order . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. C (providing for the arrest of the vessel in proceedings in rem); 
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 53, § 14-3, at 895–97 (describing in rem procedures for arrest of the vessel,
followed by publication if the vessel has not been released); George Rutherglen, The Contemporary
Justification for Maritime Arrest and Attachment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 549 (1989) (criticizing
aspects of maritime arrest in general, but noting that “the lack of notice after arrest poses only
theoretical problems in most cases”).
55 See Kevin Arlyck, Forged by War: The Federal Courts and Foreign Affairs in the Age of 
Revolution 123 (Sept. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with the 
Northwestern University Law Review) (stating that under standard procedure in admiralty, the court in a 
particular case “issued a writ of attachment against the vessel and a monition directing any interested 
parties to show cause why the libel should not be sustained”); see also WAPLES, supra note 49, § 64, at 
88 (“Notice in actions in rem is doubly given: by seizure and by publication.”); id. § 70, at 95 
(indicating that publication of notice of admiralty proceedings is called a monition); cf. Nelson, supra 
note 1, at 1572 (discussing the development of quasi in rem proceedings in England, and the importance 
of the “purported issuance and attempted service” on the defendant, even if the summons were “not 
actually delivered in a way that the defendant would learn of it”); id. at 1573–74 (discussing similar 
requirements of a summons or voluntary appearance in the United States). 
56 Jennings, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 23; Kevin Arlyck, Plaintiffs v. Privateers: Litigation and Foreign 
Affairs in the Federal Courts, 1816–1822, 30 L. & HIST. REV. 245, 265–66 (2012) (discussing various 
cases where those claiming ownership initiated libels); Arlyck, supra note 55, at 157 (discussing cases 
filed by British consuls as to ships captured by French privateers and brought into United States ports); 
cf. id. at 211 (noting that privateers’ violations of American neutrality could justify restoration to the 
owners). 
57 Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 312–13 (1818); see also id. at 313 (“The decree of the 
court acts upon the thing in controversy, and settles the title of the property itself, the right of seizure, 
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One might object that in a proceeding lacking personal service and 
making the entire world adversaries, the proceedings would end up without 
anyone contesting the libel. And that was indeed sometimes the case.58 The 
arrest of the ship as part of the libel proceeding, however, generally gave 
notice to the master of the captured vessel, and the courts treated the master 
as the representative of the owners of the vessel, cargo,59 and insurers.60 
Accordingly, masters, as well as the owners of vessels and cargos,61 and 
and the question of forfeiture. If its decree were not binding upon all the world upon the points which it 
professes to decide, the consequences would be most mischievous to the public. In case of 
condemnation no good title to the property could be conveyed, and no justification of the seizure could 
be asserted under its protection.”). 
58 Pfander and Birk cite Kevin Arlyck’s thesis for the proposition that early prize claims were often 
nonadversarial, which Arlyck attributed to the fact that there was nothing to litigate. See Pfander & 
Birk, supra note 9, at 1369 & n.93; Arlyck, supra note 55, at 260–64 (particularly describing 
occurrences during the War of 1812). The procedures mentioned above, see supra note 51, for securing 
the ship’s papers and taking depositions might have supplied conclusive evidence that the ships were 
subject to condemnation—particularly when the ships were enemy vessels. See WAPLES, supra note 49, 
§ 95, at 132 (suggesting that the evidence taken from enemy captured officers and others would seldom
be helped by further proof). Arlyck also suggests that because the proceedings moved quickly it may
have been difficult for owners to arrange representation. See Arlyck, supra note 55, at 264; see also
WAPLES, supra note 49, § 309, at 409 (explaining that enemy owners had no standing in court, but that
such an owner could make an appearance “by an agent or attorney, and deny that he is an enemy, that
his property is enemy property, that it has been used by the enemy or captured from the enemy”); cf.
McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259, 266–68 (1870) (holding it was error for the federal
court to have entered a decree pro confesso when counsel for an alleged enemy entered an appearance
in a forfeiture action); id. at 267 (indicating alien enemies who can be sued have a right to defend);
WAPLES, supra note 49, § 371, at 468 (discussing McVeigh on this point).
Whether or not owners appeared, however, a court order was needed as a prerequisite to a valid sale 
of the ships and goods. See supra note 57; Arlyck, supra note 55, at 258–59. The libel action could also 
provide for the distribution of the proceeds among the captors. See Arlyck, supra note 55, at 258–59. 
59 See, e.g., The Hiram, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 444, 445 (1814) (indicating that the master claimed the 
vessel on behalf of the owner, and the supercargo [generally a representative of the cargo owners on 
board a ship] claimed the cargo on behalf of Griffith and various other shippers); The Rapid, 12 U.S. 
(8 Cranch) 155, 155 (1814) (listing the master in the caption of a contested prize case); The Admiral, 
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 603, 611 (1865) (indicating that the master filed a claim on behalf of the British ship 
owners and the New Brunswick cargo owners). 
60 The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 146 (1815) (indicating that the insurers were considered 
parties through the master (citing Croudson v. Leonard, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 434, 437 (1808)). On the 
particular facts, however, the cargo owners were not foreclosed from seeking remission by the ship 
owners’ failing to contest the seizure which resulted in the vessel’s condemnation. Id. at 146–47. The 
owners may have failed to appear due to the worthlessness of the ship to them, given that it was subject 
to a bottomry bond. Id. A bottomry bond pledges a ship as security for repairs, and the debt is generally 
cancelled if the ship is lost on the same voyage. 
61 See, e.g., Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 6 (1794) (indicating that after a vessel 
had been captured by a French privateer, “the owners of the sloop and her cargo filed a libel in the 
District Court of Maryland, claiming restitution, because the vessel belonged to subjects of the king of 
Sweden, a neutral power, and the cargo was owned, jointly by Swedes and Americans”); The Prize 
Cases, 67 U.S (2 Black) 635, 637–38 (1863) (describing various parties seeking restoration of their 
ships); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 679 (1900) (indicating that as to both fishing vessels at issue 
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consular officials commonly appeared in the litigation as parties.62 
Contested prize cases were frequent,63 and the failure to appear was treated 
as a default.64 To the extent some interested parties did not receive notice or 
faced other difficulties in making an appearance, the proceedings 
nevertheless met then-existing procedural due process requirements, where 
service of the property and publication sufficed.65 Indeed, that some owners 
of adverse interests were outside the court’s in personam jurisdiction likely 
contributed to the perceived necessity of proceeding against the property.66 
in prize cases, a claim was interposed by the master on behalf of himself and the crew, and of the 
owner). 
62 See, e.g., The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52, 52–53 (1819) (indicating that the Spanish 
consul was claiming restitution of a ship that Buenos Ayres rebels had seized as enemy property/prize); 
cf. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 67–68 (1825) (prize case in which vice-consuls of Spain and 
Portugal sought return of captured slaves as property of their citizens); The Santa Maria, 23 U.S. 
(10 Wheat.) 431, 432 (1825) (prize case where the Spanish consul sued for restitution on behalf of the 
original owners); BENEDICT, supra note 51, at 435 (providing a form in which a consul says he believes 
libeled property is British); Arlyck, supra note 56, at 245–47 (recounting successes of consular officials 
in obtaining restoration of ships seized by privateers authorized by South American revolutionary 
governments, who had violated the federal neutrality law); id. at 263–64 (indicating that a consul could 
initiate proceedings “without specific authorization from the property owners”); id. at 265 (noting that 
consuls pressed both large and small claims). 
63 See, e.g., The Joseph, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 451 (1814); The Sally, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 382 (1814); 
The St. Lawrence, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 434 (1814); see also Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1395 
(“[T]he seized ship’s owner, captain, or crew could potentially (and sometimes did) appear to contest 
condemnation of the prize.”). See generally William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty 
Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 150 (1993) 
(discussing the many prize cases in the Supreme Court from 1789–1801). 
64 See The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 143 (characterizing the failure of American owners to show 
up to contest a forfeiture as “contumacy”); WAPLES, supra note 49, § 2, at 3 (stating requirements of all 
in rem actions include: “7. Notice of seizure and libel must be given to the world, if the world is to be 
bound by the decree. 8. Opportunity for filing claims, interventions and answers must be afforded. 9. 
Default should be entered against all non-appearers”); id. § 95, at 132 (indicating that in prize cases, the 
evidence, generally taken “from the captured officers and others of the prize,” will be presented to the 
court though no one may have appeared); BENEDICT, supra note 51, §§ 449–52 (discussing defaults); cf. 
Stratton v. Jarvis, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 4, 8–9 (1834) (describing procedures of a libel for salvage and 
reflecting an expectation that property owners would appear). 
65 See WAPLES, supra note 49, § 64, at 89 (indicating that the presumption of notice might in many 
cases be incorrect, “but the presumption is necessary to the very existence of proceedings in rem [and 
t]he cases of hardship are comparatively few, while the benefits of this mode of procedure are so great
that it would be almost impossible to enforce our revenue and navigation laws, liens in admiralty, and
many statute rights, without the use of it”). 
66 See supra note 57 and accompanying text; WAPLES, supra note 49, § 308, at 408 (“Why, since 
the right to condemn is always found in the hostility implied from ownership, must the proceedings 
always be in rem? Because we have no jurisdiction over a public enemy so as to sue him in 
personam.”); id. § 625, at 772 (“And whatever there may be of apparent injustice in the system, there is 
another side from which it may be viewed where the injustice of refusing the action is very much more 
apparent.”). 
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C. Remission of Forfeitures
A variety of embargo, revenue, and customs laws provided for 
forfeiture of ships and goods involved in violation of those laws.67 Some 
forfeiture proceedings were part of the prize jurisdiction.68 Whether or not 
involving prize, forfeitures generally proceeded as in rem libel actions.69 
Statutes also provided that the party whose property had been subject to 
forfeiture could seek a remission, that is, forgiveness of the forfeitures in 
whole or part.70 The remission procedure was often seen as a continuation 
of the in rem forfeiture proceedings because the remission affected the 
distribution of the property in the hands of the court.71 
A libel and remission might proceed as follows. Customs officials of a 
particular port seized ships and goods for violations of the embargo or 
customs laws. At the instance of the seizing officials, the District Attorney 
for the United States then brought the libel or forfeiture proceeding.72 
Customs officials had strong incentives to participate in the proceedings 
because they would be entitled to a half (moiety) or some other portion of 
the proceeds if the court held the goods forfeit.73 
After a court determined the property was subject to forfeiture but 
before the distribution of proceeds, an owner might file in the libeling court 
a petition for remission. The remissions were governed by statute which 
67 See Nelson, supra note 52, at 2465–66. 
68 See, e.g., The Mary, 12 US (8 Cranch) at 389–92 (involving prize and a remission). 
69 An application for remission of a penalty presumably might proceed in personam. Notice would 
still be given to the government and the officers. See, e.g., Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122. 
70 See, e.g., id. 
71 See United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 292 (1825) (stating that the “suit, or 
prosecution, does not end with the judgment, but embraces the execution,” which could be affected by a 
remission after the judgment); M’Lane v. United States, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 404, 424 (1832) (“Where a 
sentence of condemnation has been finally pronounced in a case of seizure, the court, as an incident to 
the possession of the principal cause, has a right to proceed to decree a distribution of the proceeds, 
according to the terms prescribed by law.”). 
72 The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 458 (1868) (stating that while the libel mentioned 
the name of the informer, the suits were initiated by the District Attorney for the United States); 
BENEDICT, supra note 51, at 546–51 (providing examples of libels brought by the District Attorney of 
the United States for the Southern District of New York). 
73 See Morris, 23 U.S. at 290–91 (noting the duty of the collector to prosecute the claims on behalf 
of the government and that while customs officers were parties in interest, they were subordinate to the 
United States as the formal party); The Princess of Orange, 19 F. Cas. 1336, 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1831) (No. 
11,431) (explaining that the collector of customs confiscated smuggled jewels and diamonds, and 
“directed the district attorney to prosecute the goods for condemnation”); cf. Dorsheimer v. United 
States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 166, 166 (1868) (indicating as to the internal revenue laws, that the collectors 
have authority to prosecute for recovery of fines and forfeitures on behalf of the United States, and that 
the collector or deputy collector to first inform would receive a moiety (citing Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 
173, § 179, 13 Stat. 223, 305)). 
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prescribed standards by which the Secretary of the Treasury could grant 
them, such as the lack of “wilful negligence or any intention of fraud” by 
the owner.74 The court made fact-findings relevant to this standard and 
forwarded them to the Secretary.75 The Secretary’s determination of 
remission was returned to the court administering the forfeiture, such that 
the determination would generally control the disposition of the property. 
The Secretary’s remission determination, if within statutory authority, 
foreclosed not only the interest of the United States but also that of the 
customs officials in their moiety of the remitted amounts.76 The ability of 
the Secretary to foreclose the interests of seizing officials resulted from the 
Court’s seeing the rights of forfeiture and remission as belonging to the 
United States rather than to the customs officials.77 
The back and forth between the Court and the Secretary of Treasury 
may appear violative of rules against executive review of judicial 
determinations.78 Whatever their other constitutional defects, however, the 
judges’ proceedings generally did not lack adversity. The initial remission 
statute provided: 
[T]he said judge shall inquire in a summary manner into the circumstances of
the case, first causing reasonable notice to be given to the person or persons
claiming such fine, penalty or forfeiture, and to the attorney of the United
States for such district, that each may have an opportunity of showing cause
against the mitigation or remission thereof . . . .79
74 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 122–23; see also Act of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 33, § 1, 
2 Stat. 804, 805 (directing the Secretary of the Treasury to remit all forfeitures, penalties, and fines for 
bona fide American property brought to the country after the declaration of war in a nonclandestine 
manner). 
75 See Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 285 (“The facts are submitted to the Secretary, for the sole 
purpose of enabling him to form an opinion, whether there was willful negligence, or intentional 
fraud . . . .”); The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 722 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9,072) (discussing the 
necessity of transmission of the statement of facts by the judge to the Secretary). 
76 See Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 292, 296 (indicating that the United States could grant 
remission even after condemnation). 
77 Id. 
78 Cf. Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 
123, 133 (characterizing remissions actions as “truly judicial” even though they “did not involve the 
decision of cases or controversies”).  
79 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 122; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 13, § 1, 
1 Stat. 506, 506 (containing a similar notice provision); Act of Jan. 2, 1813, ch. 7, § 1, 2 Stat. 789, 789–
90 (referring to persons petitioning under the Act of March 3, 1797); Act of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 33, § 1, 
2 Stat. 804, 805 (same); cf. M’Lane v. United States, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 404, 406–07, 424–25 (1832) 
(statement of facts showing notice to the collector, in a proceeding under the Act of July 29, 1813, 
giving the ship owners the same benefits as under the Act of Jan. 2, 1813 (citing Act of July 29, 1813, 
ch. 34, § 1, 6 Stat. 122, 122)). Pfander and Birk advert to the notice provision in the 1790 statute, but 
state, “the district judge could proceed to assemble a factual record even where no adverse party came 
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Despite their claims being seen as more or less derivative of the 
government’s, the customs officials were considered parties in interest with 
a right to appear before the judge to contest the petitioner’s request for 
remission even if the United States favored it.80 In M’Lane v. United States, 
for example, the collector was given notice and presented a protest, and 
that protest was appended to the judge’s fact-findings forwarded to the 
Secretary.81 Even after the Secretary’s order of remission, the officers in 
M’Lane successfully argued in the court that a certain part of the proceeds 
was not statutorily remittable.82 
* *  *
Pfander and Birk provided as historical examples of original non-
contentious proceedings a number of in rem-type proceedings: 
bankruptcies, receiverships, prize, and remissions. Such proceedings, 
however, all responded to a need to resolve conflicting claims to property 
that were difficult to adjust by agreement, provided service comporting 
with procedural due process, and could affect claims to the property even if 
parties failed to appear. In addition, those with adverse interests frequently 
appeared to make adverse arguments. The in rem-type proceedings do not 
undermine the need for adverse legal interests as a requirement for Article 
III cases. 
III. WARRANTS
Pfander and Birk also offer warrants as an example of original non-
contentious litigation in the federal courts.83 Courts and magistrates 
generally issue warrants without the participation of the person whose 
property or liberty may be impaired. As is true for in rem proceedings, 
warrant practice reflects a need to affect adverse interests that cannot easily 
be adjusted by agreement between the parties—here, the government and 
the target. The obvious justification for proceeding ex parte is that notice to 
forward to contest the petition for remission.” Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1366–67, 1366 nn.74–
76, 1367 n.77.  
80 The Princess of Orange, 19 F. Cas. 1336, 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1831) (No. 11,431) (rejecting, in a 
proceeding under the Act of March 3, 1797, the government’s argument that the collector could not 
oppose the remission, when the government was supporting the claim for remission so that the seized 
jewels could be returned to King of the Netherlands from whom they were stolen). 
81 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 407. 
82 Id. at 428–29; see also The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 722–23 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9,072) 
(indicating remission could not apply as to an importation occurring after the passage of the act 
authorizing remissions). 
83 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1375, 1441. 
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the target may make the goods or the person harder to secure.84 The lack of 
a requirement of advance notice to the target is an aspect of procedural due 
process in this context; it is not about the lack of adverse interests. 
 The absence of notice, moreover, was generally soon remedied. As 
shown by Telford Taylor, after issuance of the warrant, its execution 
generally gave immediate notice to the target, and frequently led to 
immediate adverse arguments.85 For example, the victim of a theft might 
swear out a complaint stating probable cause to believe that stolen goods 
would be found in a particular place.86 If the goods were found, both the 
goods and the suspect were brought immediately before the judge. The 
search target could argue that the goods were in fact his own and should be 
restored to him.87 Similarly, in early twentieth-century federal cases, 
persons whose goods were seized could move for their return, either as part 
of a criminal action if they were already defendants or in a separate 
proceeding.88 Arrest warrants also give notice to the arrestee upon their 
execution and give rise to adversary determinations of the legality of 
detention and, eventually, of criminal liability. 
To support their claim of a lack of adverseness as to warrants, Pfander 
and Birk cite the fact that historically “a lawful warrant” would have the 
effect of providing a defense to the searching individuals if the search 
84 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 765 (1994) 
(indicating that an ex parte warrant for contraband, criminal instrumentalities, and other dangerous 
items “could issue, without notice to the owner of the place, lest he be tipped off and spirit away the 
goods, or lest the items cause imminent harm”); cf. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 59–60 (noting that search 
warrants can be used to find incriminating evidence, whereas a subpoena to the defendant requiring him 
to turn over the same evidence would run into Fifth Amendment problems). 
85 TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 82 (“Temporary restraining order and search warrant differ in that the 
initial clandestinity is a necessary feature only of the latter, but they are alike in the far more basic 
respect that both are ancillary ex parte preludes to confrontation and controversy.”); see also Amar, 
supra note 84, at 803 (noting that in the past, notice was “contemporaneous with the intrusion”). 
86 Cf. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 44–45 (indicating that stolen goods warrants were common for 
much of the nineteenth century, but began to fade with the appearance of the exclusionary rule and 
organized police forces). 
87 Cf. Halsted v. Brice, 13 Mo. 171, 175 (1850) (in a trespass action, holding that the warrant 
should not have been admitted as to ownership of the seized tools, given that the warrant was informal 
and insufficient). Many of the warrant cases used as authority in this section, including Halsted, were 
cited by Taylor. See TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 44 & 188 n.71, 86 & 202 n.194. 
88 See, e.g., Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 223–25 (1929) (noting the use of motions in 
advance of trial for return of the property and suppression of the evidence); id. at 225–27 (discussing 
independent proceedings for return of evidence, as by a stranger to the litigation, or where the criminal 
proceeding has been disposed of, or after acquittal); id. at 227–28 (indicating that motions made by 
defendants pretrial for suppression were generally interlocutory and not immediately appealable). 
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victim sued them in trespass.89 To be sure, legal warrants often supplied a 
defense to trespass actions and thus could limit contestation by way of such 
post-search actions. Even a warrant lawfully issued on a showing of 
probable cause, however, did not necessarily give a defense to the 
complainant on a stolen goods warrant if no stolen goods were found.90 
Contests occurred, moreover, as to whether warrants were indeed lawful. 
Trespass defendants could be liable if probable cause and good faith were 
absent91 or if there were inadequate descriptions of places and goods.92 In 
all events, contests seeking return of property were available.93 
89 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1375–76; see also Amar, supra note 84, at 774 (indicating that 
if there was no warrant accompanying a search, the target could have a trespass suit); id. at 781 
(indicating that if a warrant was issued from a court of general jurisdiction, the determination of 
probable cause would be treated as res judicata and could only be questioned by a higher court). 
90 See, e.g., Chipman v. Bates, 15 Vt. 51, 58–61 (1843) (noting there was a dispute as to whether 
the complainant on a stolen goods warrant was strictly liable for trespass as the goods were not 
recovered, but finding that the open door meant there was no liability); Beaty v. Perkins, 6 Wend. 382, 
383–86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831) (noting some English cases indicating that the informer on a stolen goods 
warrant could be strictly liable if no goods were found, but holding that the officer and the complainant 
could defend as the warrant was legally issued and executed); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering 
the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 589, 652 (1999) (discussing potential tort 
liability for private parties and officers who acted as complainants on warrants in the event of a fruitless 
search); id. at 626–27 (discussing the extent to which a warrant justified the executing officer’s 
actions); id. at 652–53, 653 n.295 (noting that customs officers sometimes had protection from seizures 
which were later overturned by a court if they had reasonable cause). As Davies points out, officers 
might act as complaining witnesses and could be liable on the same terms as private complainants, who 
might be liable for a fruitless search despite a lawful warrant. See id. at 652 (“Moreover, an officer who 
initiated a revenue search was as accountable as a private complainant.”). But cf. Pfander & Birk Reply, 
supra note 9, at 1083 (“[P]ossible spin-off claims do not alter the fact that the constable could claim 
legal protection from a trespass action when acting pursuant to a lawful warrant.”). 
 Exceeding the scope of the warrant could similarly lead to liability. See, e.g., Larthet v. Forgay, 
2 La. Ann. 524 (1847) (affirming a judgment of liability for detaining a tobacconist and searching his 
shop, which was next to the cabaret specified in the warrant); Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464, 472 (1850) 
(indicating that both the complaining witness and sheriff could be liable when the warrant commanded 
the search of the dwelling house of the individual leasing the premises to the plaintiff, but not the 
dwelling of the plaintiff himself). 
91 This was particularly true for the complaining witnesses. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
340–41, 341 n.3 (1986) (“In 1871, the generally accepted rule was that one who procured the issuance 
of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable if the complaint was made 
maliciously and without probable cause.”); id. at 344–45 (holding that a police officer whose warrant 
application resulted in an arrest alleged to be unconstitutional was only entitled to qualified immunity, 
which would be lost in the absence of probable cause); Randall v. Henry, 5 Stew. & P. 367, 378 (Ala. 
1834) (noting that in a malicious prosecution case, the fact that the magistrate issued the warrant did not 
constitute an excuse if there was malice and no probable cause); Carey v. Sheets, 67 Ind. 375, 375–76, 
378 (1879) (finding that while the constable could justify his actions under the warrant, those who 
procured the warrant could be liable for malicious prosecution if there were both want of probable 
cause and malice); Bell v. Keepers, 14 P. 542, 543 (Kan. 1887) (indicating that the person who swore 
out a complaint leading to the issuance of an arrest warrant could be liable if there was malice and no 
probable cause). 
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It is true that modern surveillance warrants are problematic from an 
Article III case or controversy requirement, as Taylor argued, because 
revelation and possible adverse contest will be delayed if they occur at all.94 
National security orders are particularly likely to escape eventual notice 
and adverse contests.95 This Article does not enter the debate about the 
legality of such national security orders.96 Traditional warrants, however, 
not only affected adverse legal interests but also generally gave notice and 
an opportunity for adverse argument. In summary, warrants presented a 
need for a determination of adverse legal interest that could not be resolved 
voluntarily, a need for a pre-notice determination of whether the warrant 
should issue, and a post-execution ability to contest at least some aspects of 
the warrant’s validity. 
92 See Reed v. Rice, 25 Ky. (2 J.J. Marsh) 44, 45–47 (1829) (holding that although those 
summoned to assist would not be held liable for trespass, the complainant and the constable executing 
the warrant could be liable given the lack of an adequate description of the place to be searched as 
required by the Kentucky constitution); Barker v. Stetson, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 53, 54 (1856) (stating that 
if the warrant for seizure was issued under an unconstitutional statute, both the magistrate and the 
officer could be liable in trespass); Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. (13 Tyng) 286, 288–89 (1816) 
(indicating the defendant revenue inspectors could have been liable because the warrant was not 
specific enough as to the persons whose houses were to be searched and goods that were the object of 
the search); id. at 289–90 (indicating that the damages might be slight because only forfeitable goods 
were taken); id. at 288–89 (indicating that the failure to attach the complaint did not vitiate a warrant, 
while also stating that if the warrant did not state any sufficient cause it would not justify the entry); cf. 
Davies, supra note 90, at 647–48 (providing authority that success of the search was not necessarily 
sufficient justification for violation of the home). Pfander and Birk do note that overbroad warrants did 
not confer immunity. Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1376 n.127. 
93 See TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 48 (stating that there is an opportunity to quash the warrant and 
seek restoration of the property seized, although this provides little protection if nothing is seized, with 
trespass actions being “a very forlorn hope”); id. at 82 (stating that the return on the warrant provides an 
immediate opportunity to move to suppress the warrant and seek return of seized items). 
94 Id. at 79–88 (criticizing procedures for surveillance warrants, and noting problems as to “case or 
controversy” criteria including the lack of adverse parties). 
95 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1463 (noting the problem that targets may lack notice); see also 
id. at 1349 n.3, 1462–65 (discussing debate over FISA warrants). Congress in 2015 provided for the 
appointment of attorneys to serve as amicus curiae in the FISA court, under rules of the presiding 
judges, to provide as appropriate, inter alia, “legal arguments that advance the protection of individual 
privacy and civil liberties.” USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(1), (i)(4)(A), 
129 Stat. 268, 279 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(1), (i)(4)(A) (2015)). 
96 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1161 (2015) (raising questions as to the constitutionality of certain FISA procedures); Jack Goldsmith, 
Internal Checks and Balances in the National Security Agency, JACK GOLDSMITH (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://jackgoldsmith.org/internal-checks-balances-national-security-agency/ [https://perma.cc/762P-
YBJR] (discussing the necessity for secrecy, and that internal checks try “to replicate in secret the role 
that checks and balances normally play in public”). 
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IV. COLLUSIVE SUITS
Pfander and Birk provide some examples of non-contentious 
jurisdiction as to which the Court expressed criticism and declined 
jurisdiction—particularly collusive suits where the parties had, in some 
sense, cooperated in seeking a decision from the courts. They claim, 
however, that “the decisions that restrict the use of collusive cases do not 
actually question the power of the federal courts to hear non-contentious 
proceedings in general, but only collusive proceedings that assume the 
form of contentious ones.”97 Their examples include Lord v. Veazie98 and 
friendly shareholder litigation.99 Further exploration of these cases, 
however, reinforces a general requirement of adverse interests. 
Any assessment of collusive suits requires distinguishing instances in 
which the parties lacked genuinely adverse legal interests (hereinafter 
“merits collusion”) and cases where the parties had adverse legal interests 
but colluded primarily to set up a cause of action and obtain jurisdiction in 
the lower federal courts or in the Supreme Court (hereinafter “jurisdictional 
collusion”).100 Examples of both can be found in early Supreme Court 
practice. Fletcher v. Peck101 presents an example of merits collusion, where 
parties without genuine adverse interests set up a case to secure a decision 
to uphold the Yazoo land grants.102 Hylton v. United States, which upheld a 
federal carriage tax,103 appears to be more a case of jurisdictional collusion, 
where parties with $16 in controversy alleged with obvious falsity that over 
97 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1433; see also id. at 1435 (describing the reprobated cases as 
those that “aim[] to secure a precedent rather than to resolve a dispute”). 
98 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850); Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1433. 
99 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1436–37; id. at 1437–38, 1440 (arguing that a principal concern 
as to friendly disputes regarding constitutional issues was that the parties could not be relied on to 
develop an adequate record). 
100 Lindsay G. Robertson, “A Mere Feigned Case”: Rethinking the Fletcher v. Peck Conspiracy 
and Early Republican Legal Culture, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 249, 259 (“Feigned issues, like legal fictions, 
had developed in England to provide a means around jurisdictional impediments in a restrictive 
pleading environment.”); see Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 
1838–39 (2007) (discussing heavy reliance on pleadings, and cases where the Court held that a party 
had waived the lack of diversity by not raising it, and how parties could collude to have their case tried 
in federal court by a combination of a plaintiff’s jurisdictional plea and defendant’s non-objection); id. 
at 1839–41 (discussing procedural roadblocks to contesting subject matter jurisdiction); cf. Pfander & 
Birk, supra note 9, at 1434–35 (noting that early feigned cases could be somewhat like modern 
declaratory judgments and were trying to assure a federal forum for a resolution of a real dispute). The 
categories of merits and jurisdictional collusion will not always be perfectly distinct. 
101 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
102 Robertson, supra note 100, at 252–56. There may also have been jurisdictional collusion as to 
the amount in controversy. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 344–45.  
103 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175, 181 (1796). 
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$2000 was in controversy to meet a requirement for Supreme Court 
review.104 Merits collusion, where adverse legal interests are lacking, is a 
more serious challenge to adverseness requirements than jurisdictional 
collusion. The Court, however, dismissed neither Fletcher nor Hylton 
based on the cooperation of the parties. 
Over time, however, the Supreme Court backed away from 
countenancing merits collusion, resulting in part from an increasing 
willingness to look beyond the face of the pleadings to determine 
justiciability and jurisdictional questions.105 In Lord v. Veazie, the Court 
dismissed a suit between two parties effectively seeking a determination 
that a nonparty bank did not own certain navigation rights in the Penobscot 
River.106 Chief Justice Roger Taney stated as to the parties, “it is evident 
that their interest in the question brought here for decision is one and the 
same, and not adverse . . . .”107 Chief Justice Taney distinguished amicable 
cases where the parties will, “for the purpose of obtaining a decision of the 
controversy, . . . mutually admit facts which they know to be true.”108 He 
explained “there must be an actual controversy, and adverse interests. The 
amity consists in the manner in which it is brought to issue before the 
court.”109 
The Court similarly dismissed Wood-Paper Co. v. Heft for the lack of 
adverse interests.110 In that case, a patent holder brought an infringement 
action which was dismissed by the lower court. The plaintiff patent holder 
then purchased the competing patent and sought by appeal to have the trial 
104 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 
1798–1888, at 32 (1985) (characterizing the Court’s willingness to decide Hylton as “extraordinary”); 
Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the 
Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 613 n.173 (noting the transparent effort to get 
around the jurisdictional amount and the fact that “the United States had apparently paid Hylton’s 
attorneys”); Robertson, supra note 100, at 262–63 (discussing Hylton, as well as Pennington v. Coxe, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33 (1804), which also contested a tax). 
105 See Collins, supra note 100, at 1861–70 (discussing the Taney Court’s decreasing reliance on 
the face of the pleadings to determine subject matter jurisdiction). 
106 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 254–56 (1850). 
107 Id. at 254; see also Morley, supra note 7, at 657–64 (discussing Veazie and other cases where 
the parties were seeking the same relief). 
108 Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 255. 
109 Id.; cf. 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
TANEY PERIOD 1836–64, at 538 (1974) (indicating that in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 
(1842), the Pennsylvania legislature arranged for a trial with a special verdict against Prigg, so that a 
constitutional challenge to the Pennsylvania statute as to fugitive slaves could reach the Supreme 
Court); id. at 602 (discussing how the parties in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), 
cooperated to shape the case for an appeal to the Supreme Court); id. at 601 (providing facts indicating 
there was a genuine dispute between Scott and Sanford). 
110 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 333, 336 (1869). 
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court’s decision overturned with an apparent aim to prejudice parties in 
other patent litigation.111 
Its increased willingness to look beyond the pleadings sometimes led 
the Court to reject cases involving jurisdictional collusion.112 Nevertheless, 
the Court remained amenable to many forms of jurisdictional collusion. 
Indeed, the Taney Court, which decided Veazie and Heft, approved the use 
of shareholder derivative actions as a means for corporations to obtain 
federal diversity jurisdiction for challenges to allegedly unconstitutional 
state laws. If incorporated in a particular state, a corporation would not be 
diverse from that state’s enforcement officials. The corporation therefore 
faced problems in attempting to bring a federal court suit against state 
officers, particularly before general federal question jurisdiction was 
available.113 In Dodge v. Woolsey, however, the Court allowed an out-of-
state shareholder to bring a derivative action against the in-state 
corporation in federal court to contest the corporation’s paying a tax 
alleged to violate the Contracts Clause.114 The shareholder suit would 
become a staple of constitutional challenges, as would similar suits by 
corporate bond trustees.115 
Such shareholder and trustee suits seeking injunctions against the 
corporation’s compliance with unconstitutional laws were, for the most 
111 See id. at 334 (statement of the case, describing allegations of the intervenor that the suit “was 
now carried on without the appellees having any further interest in the defence, and for the purpose of 
obtaining the decree of this court in favor of the complainants to influence suits pending in the circuits 
in their favor and against strangers to this suit, . . . and that the intervenor was a defendant in one of 
these suits”). 
112 See, e.g., Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 134–35 (1873) (affirming the decree 
from the state court upholding the constitutionality of a state prohibition law, but refusing to decide the 
constitutionality of the application of such a law to liquor owned prior to passage of the law, given that 
it was unlikely that the ownership extended back to 1851 when the liquor law had first been passed); id. 
at 135 (reasoning that the plaintiff could not have proven the facts necessary for the claim and that the 
Iowa Supreme Court did not consider it an issue raised by the record); Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Sav. 
Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Tr. Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905) (realigning the company as a plaintiff 
and thereby destroying diversity in a contract suit, where the suit was an attempt to avoid the effect of a 
prior decision against the company in the state supreme court); id. at 181 (finding no Contracts Clause 
issue that would sustain federal question jurisdiction); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 303–04 
(1943) (per curiam) (dismissing where the landowner had engineered a friendly suit with a tenant who 
did not actually participate, to contest a federal price control act, although it was not alleged that any 
false allegation was made, and although the United States had intervened to defend the act). 
113 See Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 
107 YALE L.J. 77, 90 (1997) (discussing potential obstacles faced by the corporation or shareholders 
attempting to obtain diversity to challenge government action in federal courts). 
114 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 356–61 (1855); see also Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 91 (discussing 
Dodge). 
115 Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 95–98, 97 n.104, 98 n.110. 
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part, genuinely contentious, despite the lack of adversity between the 
shareholders and the corporation. Along with the corporation, in-state 
government enforcement officials were also party defendants.116 The 
shareholders’ and corporation’s interests were adverse to the interests of 
the enforcement official. 
It is true that the Court in Hawes v. Oakland announced that it was 
promulgating an equity rule requiring an affidavit from the plaintiff that 
“the suit is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United States 
jurisdiction in a case of which it could otherwise have no cognizance.”117 
The Court, however, often applied the rule leniently—allowing a suit, for 
example, where the disagreement alleged between the shareholders and 
directors was that the directors had declined to file suit because of 
“embarrassments” to the corporation’s raising its rights in state court.118 
While the Court continued to entertain numerous shareholder and trustee 
suits into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,119 such suits 
116 See, e.g., Dodge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 336 (“[The plaintiff] makes George C. Dodge, the tax 
collector, the directors of the bank, and the bank itself, defendants.”). Pfander and Birk note the Court’s 
expressions of misgivings about friendly suits, such as in Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. 
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892), a case between a railroad passenger and a railroad in the state trial court. 
See Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1436 & n.418. In Wellman, however, the plaintiff had not joined a 
government official in the trial court. See 143 U.S. at 344. The Supreme Court noted that the 
government had appeared in the Michigan Supreme Court, id., and the United States Supreme Court 
went on to affirm the judgment below holding that the rate regulation was valid. Id. at 346; cf. Atherton 
Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 15–16 (1922) (noting that this case differed from Truax v. Raich, 
239 U.S 33, 38 (1915), in that the plaintiff challenging a labor act had failed to join a government 
official as a party, but ultimately holding the case moot because the child laborer had aged out of the 
act’s coverage). 
117 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881); see Equity Rule 94, 104 U.S. ix, ix–x (1882) (enacting nearly 
identical language); see also John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative 
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 266 (1981) 
(treating Hawes as indicating a policy to move away from a disreputable form of litigation). 
118 Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13, 15–16 (1881); see Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 97 
& n.101 (discussing Greenwood on this point). 
119 See, e.g., Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 154 U.S. 362, 388–93 (1894) (entertaining a suit 
by an out-of-state trustee on railroad bonds contesting allegedly unreasonable rates); Smyth v. Ames, 
169 U.S. 466, 469–70 (1898) (statement of the case, indicating that diverse shareholders sued the 
corporations and state officers); Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 128 (noting continued use of diversity 
for raising constitutional challenges, even after 1875). Even when litigants relied on federal question as 
a basis for jurisdiction, they continued to use the shareholder suit for some time. See Ex parte Young, 
209 U.S. 123, 143–45 (1908) (indicating in a shareholder case that there was no claim of diversity 
jurisdiction, and upholding the suit as a federal question case); see also Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. 
Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199–202 (1921) (upholding federal question jurisdiction in a shareholder action 
challenging a bank’s investments in bonds alleged to have been issued in excess of congressional 
power); Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 97 n.104 (suggesting that the shareholder form may have 
helped in showing inadequacy of remedies at law for acquiring equity jurisdiction). The requirements as 
to adversity do not appear to have been more stringent in diversity “controversies” than in the federal 
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eventually fell from use with the rise of anticipatory federal question 
actions.120 
Similarly evidencing the Court’s willingness to allow jurisdictional 
collusion were equity receiverships.121 Receiverships, as noted above, were 
a means to adjust the debts of insolvent corporations.122 Diversity 
jurisdiction would be obtained in federal court by using a diverse creditor 
to initiate the proceeding, usually based on enforcement of creditors’ rights 
in some form.123 Through appointment of ancillary receivers in different 
federal courts, a federal court receivership could protect and reorganize 
assets throughout the country.124 By contrast, state insolvency proceedings 
and foreclosures could generally only reach assets and creditors within the 
state. 
Such cooperation did not mean that the creditor was giving up his 
claims, nor that the parties lacked adverse legal interests. As the Court 
stated in rejecting a challenge to a receivership initiated by a cooperative 
diverse creditor: 
It does appear that the parties to the suit desired that the administration of the 
railway affairs should be taken in hand by the Circuit Court of the United 
States, and to that end, when the suit was brought, the defendant admitted the 
averments in the bill and united in the request for the appointment of 
receivers. This fact is stated by the Circuit Judge; but there is no claim made 
that the averments in the bill were untrue, or that the debts, named in the bill 
as owing to the complainants, did not in fact exist; nor is there any question 
question “cases.” Compare Smith, 255 U.S. at 195–96 (federal question case in which the facts suggest 
a genuine disagreement with the directors), with Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 79, 
113 (1901) (holding in a diversity shareholder suit that the directors’ agreeing with the shareholders as 
to the unconstitutionality of the statute, but declining to challenge it based on prudential reasons, did not 
undermine jurisdiction). 
120 Cf. Collins, supra note 100, at 1849 & n.80 (noting cases realigning parties after federal 
question jurisdiction was available). 
121 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1386 (discussing receiverships). 
122 See supra text accompanying notes 46–47. 
123 See Byrne, supra note 48, at 77 (indicating that proceedings were generally initiated by a 
general creditor, “at the suggestion of the railroad,” by filing “a bill in behalf of himself and all other 
creditors, against the company in the proper” federal court); id. at 82 (indicating that a creditor who was 
not a citizen of the same state as any defendant would file the creditor’s bill); cf. Paul D. Cravath, The 
Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders’ and Stockholders’ Protective Committees; 
Reorganization Committees; and the Voluntary Recapitalization of Corporations, in SOME LEGAL 
PHASES, supra note 48, at 153, 155 (indicating that corporate reorganizations generally follow and are 
based on foreclosure of mortgages or enforcement of creditors rights in some form). Alternatively, the 
corporation itself might initiate the proceeding. See Byrne, supra note 48, at 82, 85–88 (indicating that 
beginning in 1884, federal courts allowed corporate initiation, although Byrne thought a creditor’s bill 
preferable). 
124 See Cravath, supra note 123, at 158–59, 213 (discussing benefits of federal receiverships for 
preserving property). 
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made as to the citizenship of the complainants . . . . That the parties preferred 
to take the subject matter of the litigation into the Federal courts, instead of 
proceeding in one of the courts of the State, is not wrongful.125 
The Court’s abjuring merits collusion in cases such as Veazie and 
Heft,126 as well as its countenancing a certain amount of jurisdictional 
collusion in shareholder suits and receiverships, both manifest the need for 
adverse interests to be at stake. 
Some instances where jurisdictional collusion resulted in dismissal 
further reinforce an adverse interest requirement. In these cases, the parties 
in some sense had genuine adverse interests and thus were not engaged in 
merits collusion, but those adverse interests were not directly at stake in the 
particular case brought before the Court, such that the Court dismissed the 
cases. 
For example, the Court dismissed San Mateo County v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad Co.127 and California v. San Pablo & Tulare Railroad 
Co.128 for lack of legal interests that would be affected. In both cases, the 
taxpayers and tax collectors cooperated in presenting test cases as to the 
legality of state taxes.129 The governments sued for taxes in state court, and 
the railroad defendants removed the cases under then-existing federal 
question removal provisions. In San Mateo County, however, the railroad 
had unconditionally paid the taxes and agreed that the taxes would not be 
refunded even if the railroad won, such that there would be no difference in 
the result of the particular tax collection suit if the law were declared 
unconstitutional.130 Similarly, in San Pablo & Tulare Railroad, the Court 
found that the railroad had tendered the tax in such a way as to extinguish 
the state’s claim according to state law.131 The California Attorney General 
argued that the case should be decided on the merits because it was a test 
case implicating several other cases and that the case should not be 
125 See In re Metro. Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 110–11 (1908). 
126 Veazie was a diversity case. Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 252 (1850) (action on a 
covenant). Heft arose under the patent jurisdiction. Wood-Paper Co. v. Heft, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 333, 334 
(1869) (bill to enjoin patent infringement); see supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text. 
127 116 U.S. 138, 141–42 (1885). 
128 149 U.S. 308, 313–14 (1893). 
129 Federal injunctions against state taxes could be somewhat harder to obtain than other 
injunctions, see Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 134, 143, even before the 1937 Tax Injunction Act. 
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
130 116 U.S. at 139–41. 
131 149 U.S. at 313–14; see also Little v. Bowers, 134 U.S. 547, 556 (1890) (dismissing a similar 
case because payment had been “in the nature of a compromise” and extinguished the controversy 
between the parties). 
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dismissed because payments were still owed in those other cases.132 The 
Court, however, required adverse legal interests to be at stake in the very 
case.133 
The Court reached a similar result in Muskrat v. United States, 
holding that Congress improperly authorized particular causes of action to 
serve as test cases.134 A 1902 statute provided for the distribution of certain 
Cherokee lands and funds to those enrolled in the tribe as of September 1, 
1902.135 Subsequent legislation, however, extended the allotment rights to 
minor children of enrolled tribe members living on the land as of March 4, 
1906.136 In a still-later statute, Congress authorized a suit against the United 
States by certain named plaintiffs representing those enrolled as of 
September 1, 1902 to challenge the constitutionality of the law adding to 
the enrollment.137 The Court, however, refused to hear the case because the 
legislatively authorized suit would not affect adverse legal interests: 
It is true the United States is made a defendant to this action, but it has no 
interest adverse to the claimants. The object is not to assert a property right as 
against the Government, or to demand compensation for alleged wrongs 
because of action upon its part. . . . Such judgment will not conclude private 
parties, when actual litigation brings to the court the question of the 
constitutionality of such legislation.138 
132 San Pablo, 149 U.S. at 312–13; see also San Mateo County, 116 U.S. at 141 (responding to the 
objection that it was a test case). 
133 San Pablo, 149 U.S. at 314; see also San Mateo County, 116 U.S. at 141–42 (dismissing the 
writ of error for “the reason that there is no longer an existing cause of action in favor of the county 
against the railroad company,” and noting that the issues could be decided in another pending case). 
The Court’s current mootness doctrine, however, is often more forgiving than these cases were. See 
infra note 139. 
134 219 U.S. 346, 360–63 (1911). 
135 Act of Jul. 1, 1902, ch. 1375, § 24, 30, 32 Stat. 716, 720–21. 
136 Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 2, 34 Stat. 137, 137–38, amended by Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 
3504, 34 Stat. 325, 341–42. The April 26, 1906 Act also extended certain prohibitions on alienation. Id. 
§ 19, 34 Stat. at 144. Another statute, Act of Mar. 11, 1904, ch. 505, 33 Stat. 65, allowed the Secretary
of the Interior to grant rights of way for pipelines over lands allotted to Indians. These additional
restrictions on the land were at issue in Brown v. United States, which was decided in tandem with
Muskrat v. United States. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 349.
137 Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1028; Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 349–51, 360. 
138 Mustkrat, 219 U.S. at 361–62. The Court ultimately decided the issues in a suit that sought to 
enjoin the Secretaries of Interior and Treasury from performing duties under the act. Gritts v. Fisher, 
224 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1912), aff’g 37 App. D.C. 473 (1911); see 37 App. D.C. at 476 (noting 
allegations that the Secretary had allotted and was about to allot lands to persons born since September 
1, 1902); cf. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 362 (noting the pendency of the other suit at the time Congress 
passed the 1907 suit-authorizing legislation, but saying that the suit-authorizing legislation “must 
depend upon its own terms and be judged by the authority which it undertakes to confer”); id. (“The 
questions involved in this proceeding as to the validity of the legislation may arise in suits between 
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In summary, the Court’s treatment of collusive cases generally 
demonstrates its insistence that adverse legal interests be at issue in the 
case. The Court refused to hear merits collusion cases such as Veazie where 
the parties lacked genuinely adverse interests. On the other hand, the Court 
countenanced much jurisdictional collusion, as in shareholder actions and 
receiverships, where adverse legal interests were at stake. But even where 
the parties were innocent of reprobated merits collusion, as in the railroad 
tax cases, the Court wanted those adverse interests at least to be at stake in 
the case before it.139 
individuals, and when they do and are properly brought before this court for consideration they, of 
course, must be determined in the exercise of its judicial functions.”). 
139 The mootness doctrine requires, at least in theory, that parties on both sides of a dispute 
maintain a personal stake throughout the litigation, in addition to having such a stake at the outset as 
required by standing doctrine. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709–11 (2011) (holding moot 
a case challenging the constitutionality of officers’ interviewing a child without parental permission or a 
warrant, because the child was almost eighteen and had moved out of the district); cf. Kingdomware 
Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1975–76 (2016) (holding that a case involving short-term 
contracts was not moot, in part because there was “a reasonable expectation that the same complaining 
party [will] be subject to the same action again” (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)); 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 203 (7th ed. 2015) (suggesting that more recent cases look for recurrence as to the same party). 
The Court, however, has sometimes allowed even a low probability of the same parties’ having the 
same adverse interests in the future to save a case from mootness. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 
529 U.S. 277, 287–89 (2000) (finding the case not moot where a nude dancing establishment that had 
obtained an injunction was now out of business but might possibly resume operation); Honig v. Doe, 
484 U.S. 305, 318–20 (1988) (as to a question under a federal act entitling handicapped children to an 
appropriate education, holding the claim moot as to a twenty-four-year-old who had aged out of the 
act’s protections, but not moot as to a twenty-year-old student who was still within the act’s protections, 
although he was not currently in the school system). 
 Class suits can rely on the interests of class members to keep a case from mootness, but questions 
remain as to the extent class members’ interests count pre-certification. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 
420 U.S. 103, 110–11 n.11 (1975) (holding a case not moot where the named plaintiff’s claim was 
currently moot, and may have been moot prior to certification); cf. Campbell–Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 
136 S. Ct. 663, 670–72 (2016) (holding that the named plaintiff’s claim in a not-yet-certified class was 
not mooted by an unaccepted offer of all relief to which he would individually be entitled); Meltzer, 
supra note 8, at 309–11 (discussing whether class status changes justiciability). One might see the 
federal courts’ continuing jurisdiction to entertain cases on the edge of mootness as derivative of the 
courts’ having obtained jurisdiction of a case meeting the more stringent requirements of standing (and 
hence of adverse interests) at the outset. See Sidney A. Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction to Decide Moot 
Cases, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 137–38 (1946) (expressing disfavor as to a public interest factor in 
mootness, but noting that it is sometimes used “as a ground for retaining a jurisdiction which had 
properly attached at the commencement of the litigation”); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, 
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 26 
(1984) (“[T]he personal interest needed to defeat mootness may be different from, and less than, that 
required initially to establish, standing.”); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda 
Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668–69 (2012) (indicating that the Supreme 
Court is more liberal in its justiciability doctrines when its own docket is concerned). But cf. Henry P. 
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384–85 (1973) 
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V. PENSIONS AND CITIZENSHIP
A number of Pfander and Birk’s examples of non-contentious 
jurisdiction, as discussed above, in fact manifested adverseness. In rem-
type proceedings required the determination of adverse interests in 
situations where impediments often existed to voluntary extrajudicial 
resolution. Service or notice in some form was generally provided, which 
gave opportunities for adverse argument.140 Warrants similarly affected 
adverse interests not readily amenable to voluntary extrajudicial resolution, 
with notice generally occurring upon seizure of the person or thing, and 
with potential opportunities for adverse argument thereafter.141 The results 
in the collusion cases further support the requirement of parties in the 
action with adverse interests on the merits.142 
Two of the authors’ examples of non-contentious jurisdiction, 
however, do not so readily suggest adverse interests—ex parte 
determinations of pensions143 and of citizenship.144 To be sure, one could 
argue that in these proceedings the government held the opposing interests 
and had more or less issued a blanket default on behalf of the 
government.145 On the other hand, these cases generally lacked any form of 
notice or service, even by publication or seizure.146 Such claims also lacked 
impediments to a voluntary extrajudicial resolution.147 The Executive can 
generally give a claimant a benefit under statutory criteria without 
obtaining a judgment. If the Executive denies a benefit, an adverse 
proceeding may then ensue between the claimant and the government. 
Nevertheless, the pension and naturalization examples provide little 
support for doing away with an adverseness requirement. As discussed 
(discussing arguments that the personal stake requirement, or lack thereof, should be the same as to 
standing and mootness); Lee, supra note 8, at 605 (arguing that mootness doctrines are 
subconstitutional). For further discussions of mootness, see sources cited supra note 8. 
140 See supra Part II. 
141 See supra Part III. 
142 See supra Part IV. 
143 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1364. 
144 Id. at 1361. 
145 This is Caleb Nelson’s view. See supra note 31. 
146 Cf. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 49 (1852) (discussing why the district 
court’s determination of certain treaty claims was not Article III business, and noting that the district 
attorney had no right to appear in the proceedings, although presumably he would have a duty as a 
public officer to object to the judge if he knew of a problem); Nelson, supra note 1, at 1570 (“In 
personal actions, then, a common-law court could proceed to judgment against a defendant only if the 
defendant either actually appeared or at least was given a valid command to appear, and was thereby 
brought within the court’s power.”). 
147 See supra text accompanying notes 34–45 (discussing situations where such impediments exist). 
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below, the Court treated federal judges’ pension determinations as 
appropriate, if at all, as the work of individual commissioners rather than 
Article III judges. Naturalization petitions are perhaps Pfander and Birk’s 
best example of non-contentious jurisdiction, but the Court explicitly 
approved the practice as appropriate under Article III only after provisions 
for notice to, and potential appearance by, the United States. 
A. Revolutionary War Pensions
1. Hayburn’s Case.—Under a 1792 statute, Congress gave the
federal courts the task of making certain ex parte pension determinations 
with respect to Revolutionary War veterans which then could be reviewed 
by the Secretary of War and Congress.148 Circuit justices and judges 
complained to the President that the proceedings were not of a judicial 
nature and that the Secretary of War and Congress could modify the 
judges’ determinations. The court reporter attached these communications 
to the report of Hayburn’s Case,149 but the Court did not decide the merits 
of these objections in Hayburn. For a short time thereafter, some judges 
continued to perform the work as commissioners rather than as Article III 
judges. In United States v. Yale Todd in 1794, however, the Court, without 
publishing an opinion, held invalid the judges’ work as commissioners 
under the 1792 Act.150 
Given that the judges’ objected to pension work and claimed to 
perform such work only as commissioners, the Revolutionary pensions 
example would seem to provide little support for treating ex parte benefits 
determinations as Article III cases. Pfander and Birk nevertheless treat the 
pension example as supporting their claims that Article III judges, as such, 
can decide non-contentious cases.151 They argue that the judges’ objections 
were primarily directed to the political branches’ review of judges’ pension 
determinations, rather than to the nonadversarial nature of the 
proceedings.152 
148 Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243. 
149 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792). 
150 See Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 52–53 (discussing the unreported case of United States v. 
Yale Todd); Wilfred J. Ritz, United States v. Yale Todd (U.S. 1794), 15 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 220, 
227–31 (1958) (providing the record); see also Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall’s 
Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 301, 308–10 (discussing Todd). See 
infra text accompanying notes 162–71 for further discussion of judges acting as commissioners. 
151 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1364. 
152 Id. at 1427–29; id. at 1429 (“On this account . . . the Pennsylvania circuit viewed the absence of 
finality as the master objection and identified two other criticisms that we might today characterize as 
matters of judicial dignity.”); see also Pushaw, supra note 9, at 514–16 (making a similar argument); 
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To be sure, political branch review loomed as a large concern in the 
judges’ objections, and such review alone would be sufficient to keep even 
determinations of adverse claims from being Article III judicial business.153 
On the other hand, and as others have noted, the Hayburn objections 
encompassed a concern for the nature of the work as a distinct objection 
from the concern for political branch review.154 While the Circuit Court for 
the District of New York seemed to collapse the two concerns,155 the 
Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania enumerated them separately:  
1st. Because the business directed by this act is not of a judicial nature. . . . 2d. 
Because, if, upon that business, the court had proceeded, its judgments (for its 
opinions are its judgments) might, under the same act, have been revised and 
controuled by the legislature, and by an officer in the executive department.156 
The Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina also teased out the 
separate objections: 
3. That at the same time such courts cannot be warranted . . . in exercising
(even under the authority of another act) any power not in its nature judicial,
or, if judicial, not provided for upon the terms the Constitution requires. 4.
That whatever doubt may be suggested, whether the power in question is
properly of a judicial nature, yet inasmuch as the decision of the court is not
made final, but may be at least suspended in its operation by the Secretary at
War . . . this subjects the decision of the court to a mode of revision which we
consider to be unwarranted by the Constitution . . . .157
Lee, supra note 8, at 645–47 (emphasizing the post-judgment review objection). Pfander and Birk’s 
claim that the objections to the pension work were not based on nonadverseness depends in part on how 
convincing one finds their other examples of non-contentious jurisdiction. See Pfander & Birk, supra 
note 9, at 1427 (“Perhaps the strongest evidence against an adverse-party reading of Hayburn’s Case 
lies in the federal courts’ contemporary and subsequent acceptance of ex parte duties of various sorts.”). 
153 See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561, 561 (1864) (without opinion, 
disallowing Supreme Court review of Court of Claims judgments); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 
697 (1885) (providing Chief Justice Taney’s draft opinion). 
154 Bloch, supra note 104, at 592–94 (indicating the concern was both as to political branch review 
and whether the acts were properly judicial); id. at 595 (suggesting it was impossible to know the 
relative weight of these factors); Wheeler, supra note 78, at 136–37 (noting that the objection that 
decisions were subject to nonjudicial review was distinct from the objection that the matters were not 
properly judicial). 
155 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792) (reprinting letter to the President from 
Chief Justice Jay, Justice Cushing, and District Judge Duane). 
156 Id. at 411 n.† (reprinting letter to the President from Justices Wilson and Blair, and District 
Judge Peters). 
157 Id. at 412–13 n.† (reprinting letter to the President from Justice Iredell and District Judge 
Sitgreaves); see also Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 
1988 WIS. L. REV. 527, 533–34 (discussing Justice Iredell’s objection that the matters were not of a 
judicial nature, and that the Secretary of War’s review power was objectionable); Pfander & Birk, supra 
note 9, at 1430–31 (discussing Justice Iredell’s notes, which the authors seem to treat as not particularly 
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The Court later voiced similar dual objections in United States v. 
Ferreira.158 Under congressional authority, district judges had determined 
claims under a Spanish treaty for certain injuries to Spanish officers and 
inhabitants in Florida caused by the United States Army.159 In an opinion by 
Chief Justice Taney, the Court held that it could not review the district 
court treaty determinations because the district judges were acting as 
commissioners, not deciding cases.160 The appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court was limited to cases, and the treaty proceedings were not 
Article III cases: 
For there is to be no suit; no parties in the legal acceptance of the term, are to 
be made—no process to issue; and no one is authorized to appear on behalf of 
the United States, or to summon witnesses in the case. The proceeding is 
altogether ex parte; and all that the judge is required to do, is to receive the 
claim when the party presents it, and to adjust it upon such evidence as he 
may have before him, or be able himself to obtain. But neither the evidence, 
nor his award, are to be filed in the court in which he presides, nor recorded 
there; but he is required to transmit, both the decision and the evidence upon 
which he decided, to the Secretary of the Treasury; and the claim is to be paid 
if the Secretary thinks it just and equitable, but not otherwise.161 
Thus, in both Hayburn and Ferreira, the judges’ concerns 
encompassed both the non-judicial form of the proceedings as well as 
political branch review. 
2. Judges as Commissioners as Reflected in Hayburn and Other
Cases.—What should one make of the commissioner work that
was performed by the district judges in Ferreira? This Article’s discussion 
of judges’ acting as commissioners is not an argument for the 
constitutionality of that practice but rather to show that the practice 
helpful to their claim). Pfander and Birk argue that the judges’ concerns that the pension determinations 
were not of a “judicial nature” should not be read as referring to a lack of adverse parties—supposedly a 
more modern concern—but rather as primarily an objection to viewing wounds. Pfander & Birk Reply, 
supra note 9, at 1078. But see James Iredell, Notes on Hayburn’s Case, in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 547, 548–49 (Maeva Marcus 
ed. 2007) (distinguishing the objection “Not of a Judicial nature” from the objection “Not to be 
executed in a Judicial way,” and providing inspection of wounds as an example of the latter). Given that 
the grist of judicial work is to decide adverse claims and that the need for adversity is not merely a 
modern concern, see supra notes 1, 3, 10, the “not of a judicial nature” objection would seem to 
encompass concerns for the lack of adversity. Cf. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 46–
47 (1852) (quoted as text accompanying infra note 161). 
158 54 U.S. at 47. 
159 Id. at 45. 
160 Id. at 51–52. 
161 Id. at 46–47. 
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continued after Hayburn—as Russell Wheeler has shown.162 To the extent 
that lower court judges’ making certain ex parte determinations was treated 
as commissioner work, the practices do not undermine an adverseness 
requirement for Article III cases. 
In their objections to the pension work under the 1792 Act reported 
with Hayburn, the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of New York 
concluded they personally could do the work as commissioners.163 By 
contrast, the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina 
Circuit concluded that they could not work as commissioners because the 
Act only assigned the duties to the courts, and not to the judges 
personally,164 who arguably could take on the work in a non-Article III 
capacity. As noted above, the Court in Todd, without opinion, held the 
judges’ work as commissioners under the 1792 Act invalid. Chief Justice 
Taney in Ferreira attributed the Todd decision to the statute’s assigning the 
work to the courts rather than to the individual judges—i.e., the same 
objection that had been made by the North Carolina federal court.165 
Pfander and Birk claim support for their reading of Hayburn as 
limited to an objection about political branch review by noting, “In the 
wake of Hayburn’s Case, . . . Congress reassigned pension duties to the 
district judges on an ex parte basis.”166 Because the judges only collected 
evidence that they forwarded to the Secretary of War, the authors claim that 
the problem of political branch review was gone.167 They imply that, absent 
executive or legislative review, the pension determinations were proper for 
Article III judges as such. 
Duties under the 1793 Act, however, were more readily characterized 
as commissioner work rather than Article III work. The Act provided: “All 
evidence relative to Invalids shall be taken upon oath or affirmation, before 
the judge of the district, in which such invalids reside, or before any three 
162 Wheeler, supra note 78, at 131–32. 
163 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792); Marcus & Teir, supra note 157, at 530–31, 531 n.24 
(indicating that the judges were making themselves “voluntary agents of the federal government,” and 
that Congress could have asked citizens to “volunteer to collect names for the invalid pension rolls”). 
164 Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 413 n.†. The Pennsylvania Circuit judges did not advert to the 
commissioner option. See Marcus & Teir, supra note 157, at 531–32. 
165 See CURRIE, supra note 104, at 10 (discussing that Todd may have held that judges could not 
act as commissioners, or may have been based on the statutory ground that the statute authorized 
“judges to act only as a court, not as commissioners”); Bloch, supra note 104, at 612 n.172 (stating it 
was unclear if Todd was based on lack of statutory authorization or a constitutional prohibition on the 
judges’ processing the applications in any capacity); Wheeler, supra note 78, at 138 n.74 (suggesting 
that Todd was based on interpretation of the statute). 
166 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1427; see Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324. 
167 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1427 n.380. 
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persons specially authorized by commission from the said judge.”168 This 
provision did not assign the work to the “court,” but rather the judges, thus 
avoiding the objection that surfaced in the North Carolina court’s letter and 
that may have played a role in Todd. The fact that under the 1793 Act the 
judges could “authorize[]” others “by commission” to do the work suggests 
that this was commissioner business rather than Article III cases.169 
In the statute at issue in Ferreira, Congress had similarly assigned 
certain treaty claims to district judges, not to the courts. Chief Justice 
Taney, as noted above, treated this work as commissioner work not subject 
to the Supreme Court’s review, citing both the want of adverseness as well 
as political branch review.170 This is not to say Chief Justice Taney was 
keen on the federal district judges’ acting as commissioners. Rather, he 
thought the commissioner work raised Appointments Clause issues; 
presumably he was concerned that appointment as an Article III judge did 
not encompass appointment as a non-Article III officer of the United 
States. Because the district courts’ performance of commissioner work was 
not directly before the Court, however, and would upset determinations 
assumed to be concluded, the Court declined to address the issue. Chief 
Justice Taney stated: 
And if this be the construction of the Constitution, then as the judge 
designated could not act in a judicial character as a court, nor as a 
commissioner, because he was not appointed by the President, every thing that 
has been done under the acts of 1823, and 1834, and 1849, would be void, and 
the payments heretofore made, might be recovered back by the United States. 
But this question has not been made; nor does it arise in the case. . . . and 
these laws have for so many years been acted on as valid and constitutional 
we do not think it proper to express an opinion upon it.171 
In summary, the judges did not perform Revolutionary War pension 
work as Article III judges. And to the extent the judges performed work as 
commissioners, that practice does not undermine an adverseness 
requirement for Article III cases. 
168 Act of Feb. 28, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. at 324. 
169 Cf. Wheeler, supra note 78, at 138 & n.76 (indicating that the 1793 Act was not due to the 
judges’ objections but rather to the fact that the judges had been too generous). Pfander and Birk seem 
to reject a distinction between commissioner work and Article III work. Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, 
at 1456–57. One need not accept the propriety of commissioner work, however, to recognize that it was 
performed, and not treated as Article III work. 
170 See supra text accompanying notes 158–61. 
171 United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 51–52 (1852). Pfander and Birk argue that 
Ferreira supports their claim that Hayburn should be read as a lack-of-finality case. Pfander & Birk, 
supra note 9, at 1432. 
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B. Naturalization
Pfander and Birk also rely on citizenship determinations as an instance 
of non-contentious jurisdiction.172 From an early date, Congress authorized 
both state and federal “courts,” not “judges,” to grant naturalization 
petitions ex parte under statutory standards, such as five years’ residence 
and good character.173 Granting of citizenship petitions had been 
sufficiently lax that Congress in 1906 passed a new act.174 The act, inter 
alia, limited the courts that could grant such petitions175 and required clerks 
of court to post notice of any petitions for citizenship176 and to send copies 
of petitions to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization within thirty 
days of filing.177 It also required that such proceedings be on stated days, 
that at least ninety days elapse after filing and notice of the petition,178 and 
172 Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1361. 
173 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414. 
174 Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596. The Report to the President of the 
Commission on Naturalization that preceded the legislation recounted the laxity of practices even in 
many federal courts. See MILTON D. PURDY ET AL., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION 
ON NATURALIZATION, H.R. DOC. NO. 59-46, at 20–22 (1905); see also id. at 86–87 (excerpting a 1904 
report from the Special Examiner of the Department of Justice, which criticized the practices of federal 
courts in some cities). The naturalization example thus does not suggest the wisdom of committing such 
non-contentious matters to the federal courts. 
175 Naturalization Act of 1906 § 3, 34 Stat. at 596. 
176 Id. § 5, 34 Stat. at 598. 
177 Id. § 12, 34 Stat. at 599 (“It shall also be the duty of the clerk of each of said courts . . . to 
furnish to said Bureau duplicates of all petitions within thirty days after the filing of the same, and 
certified copies of such other proceedings and orders instituted in or issued out of said court affecting or 
relating to the naturalization of aliens as may be required from time to time by the said Bureau.”); see 
also PURDY ET AL., supra note 174, at 27 (noting that the provisions of a proposed bill were defective, 
“in that there was no requirement that the Federal Government should receive notice of pending 
naturalizations, and such notice is absolutely necessary if the conferring of naturalization is to be 
effectively safeguarded”); id. (recommending that an alien make a formal petition to the court at least 
three months prior to hearing, and “it should be required that a duplicate of this petition should be sent 
as soon as it is made to the bureau of naturalization”). The Nationality Act of 1940 similarly required 
notice to the government. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 337(b), 54 Stat. 1137, 1158 
(“It shall be the duty of the clerk of each and every naturalization court to forward to the Commissioner 
a duplicate of each petition for naturalization within thirty days after the close of the month in which 
such petition was filed . . . .”); id. § 333(a), 54 Stat. at 1156 (“The Commissioner . . . shall designate 
members of the Service to conduct preliminary hearings upon petitions for naturalization to any 
naturalization court and to make findings and recommendations thereon to such court.”). The courts 
increasingly came to rely on agency recommendations, and the Immigration Act of 1990 removed “the 
courts from any involvement in cases in which the agency is prepared to award citizenship.” Nancy 
Morawetz, Citizenship and the Courts, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 447, 452–54; see Immigration Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 407(d)(13), 104 Stat. 4978, 5043 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1446 
(2012)). 
178 Naturalization Act of 1906 § 6, 34 Stat. at 598. 
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that the United States have the right to appear and to be heard in 
opposition.179 
The United States thereafter opposed a good many naturalization 
petitions.180 Parties who lost in the lower federal courts sought review in the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals. While most of the appeals apparently involved 
petitions that the United States had contested in the lower courts,181 
sometimes even unopposed petitions that the lower court denied showed up 
in the appellate courts.182 Some Courts of Appeals declined to review the 
immigration determinations, whether or not in opposed proceedings, on the 
ground that the petitions did not present “cases” as required for appellate 
review.183 
The Supreme Court considered the question of whether the citizenship 
petitions presented Article III cases that could be reviewed in the Courts of 
Appeals in Tutun v. United States.184 Tutun was under the 1906 Act, which 
gave the United States notice and an opportunity to be heard.185 If the 
government failed to appear in order to oppose the petition, the case 
resembled a default in which parties with adverse legal interests may 
choose not to assert their rights.186 The Court concluded that the 
proceedings were sufficiently adverse to be Article III cases for appellate 
review,187 reasoning that the “United States is always a possible adverse 
179 Id. § 11, 34 Stat. at 599. 
180 See, e.g., In re Centi, 217 F. 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1914) (opposed petition); see also infra note 181 
(citing other opposed cases). 
181 See, e.g., United States v. Poslusny, 179 F. 836 (2d Cir. 1910) (opposed); United States v. 
Balsara, 180 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1910) (opposed); United States v. Rodiek, 162 F. 469 (9th Cir. 1908) 
(opposed). 
182 See, e.g., Harmon v. United States, 223 F. 425 (1st Cir. 1915) (not apparently opposed). 
183 See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 574–75, 574 n.1, 575 n.2 (1926) (discussing the 
disagreement among the circuits); see also Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (“That 
the circuit courts of appeals established by this act shall exercise appellate jurisdiction to review by 
appeal or by writ of error final decision [sic] in the district court and the existing circuit courts in all 
cases other than those provided for in the preceding section of this act . . . .” (emphasis added)). This 
provision was reenacted in 1925. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 128(a), 43 Stat. 936, 936; see also 
Tutun, 270 U.S. at 575–76 (recognizing the 1925 reenactment).  
184 270 U.S. at 574. Tutun may have involved denial of an unopposed petition. See DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888–1986, at 182 
(1990). The companion case, United States v. Neuberger, apparently involved an unopposed petition. In 
re Neuberger, 6 F.2d 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1925). 
185 See supra notes 174–79. 
186 Cf. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 237 (1912) (suggesting that the government 
participation permitted by the 1906 provisions was more likely to make the proceedings adversarial). 
187 See Wheeler, supra note 78, at 134 n.61 (indicating that by the time of Tutun, the government 
was a potential adverse party). 
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party. By § 11 of the Naturalization Act [of 1906] the full rights of a 
litigant are expressly reserved to it.”188 
In dicta, however, the Court suggested that pre-1906-Act 
determinations were also cases. Justice Louis Brandeis stated, 
The federal district courts, among others, have performed that function since 
the Act of January 29, 1795 . . . . The constitutionality of this exercise of 
jurisdiction has never been questioned. If the proceeding were not a case or 
controversy within the meaning of Art. III, § 2, this delegation of power upon 
the courts would have been invalid.189 
One may view Justice Brandeis’s statement as somewhat analogous to 
Chief Justice Taney’s failure to disturb the district judges’ treaty 
commissioner work in Ferreira. In both the citizenship and treaty claims 
cases, lower court judges had performed a somewhat anomalous function 
for an extended period;190 the practice had been treated as constitutional, 
people had relied on the determinations, and their legality was not at issue 
in the case.191 
To be sure, Chief Justice Marshall in Spratt v. Spratt characterized a 
citizenship conferral as a “judgment” that could not be collaterally attacked 
by private parties in a dispute about the descent of real estate.192 A matter, 
however, could result in a “judgment”193 and be “judicial in [its] nature” 
188 Tutun, 270 U.S. at 577. 
189 Id. at 576 (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 
(13 How.) 40 (1852); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)). 
190 As noted in supra text accompanying notes 169–73, however, the citizenship determinations 
had been assigned to the courts and the treaty determinations to the judges. 
191 See Morley, supra note 7, at 668–69 (finding Tutun out of sync with the Court’s main adversity 
cases, and suggesting that it may have been influenced by historical practice); cf. Wheeler, supra note 
78, at 132–34 (treating the pre-1906 cases as an instance of extrajudicial business assigned to judges, 
analogous to commissioner cases). A Fifth Circuit decision noted that “never until the act of 1906 has it 
been suggested that the special proceedings authorized constituted a case, action, or cause that could be 
reviewed on writ of error under any judiciary act, state or federal.” United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101, 
104–05 (5th Cir. 1910) (a pre-Tutun decision rejecting appeals from citizenship petitions even under the 
1906 Act). In an unreported 1800 case, Ex parte Fitzbonne, a party denied citizenship obtained a 
mandamus from the Supreme Court. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1363 (citing 8 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 157, at 389–90). 
192 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 393, 408–09 (1830). Chief Justice Marshall’s statement arose in the context of a 
dispute between private parties as to descent of real estate. One side argued that the decedent, contrary 
to the citizenship determination, had acquired the land while still an alien, which would lead to that 
side’s succeeding to the land. Id. at 400–03; see also Campbell v. Gordon, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 176, 182 
(1810) (holding in an inheritance dispute that if the naturalization oath were administered, it must be 
assumed the court made proper findings, and that the oath “amounts to a judgment of the court”). 
193 Cf. Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561, 561 (1864) (without opinion, disallowing 
Supreme Court review of Court of Claims judgments); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 699 
(1885) (providing Chief Justice Taney’s draft opinion in Gordon, stating that the fact that the tribunal 
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without being an Article III case, as Chief Justice Taney pointed out with 
respect to the commissioner determinations in Ferreira.194 Insulation from 
collateral attack by private parties, moreover, was not a characteristic only 
of full-fledged judgments but could also attend executive grants of interests 
that initially belonged to the body politic rather than to discrete 
individuals.195 In a 1912 case, the Court allowed the government to attack 
collaterally a pre-1906 naturalization both because the government was 
more directly interested than third parties and because the pre-1906 
naturalization proceedings lacked some of the attributes of normal judicial 
proceedings.196 The Court stated: 
An examination of this [pre-1906] legislation makes it plain that while a 
proceeding for the naturalization of an alien is in a certain sense a judicial 
proceeding, being conducted in a court of record and made a matter of record 
therein, yet it is not in any sense an adversary proceeding. It is the alien who 
applies to be admitted, who makes the necessary declaration and adduces the 
requisite proofs . . . . But he is not required to make the Government a party 
nor to give any notice to its representatives. 
 The act of June 29, 1906 . . . declares that the United States shall have the 
right to appear in naturalization proceedings for the purpose of cross-
examining the petitioner and the witnesses produced in support of his petition, 
and shall have the right to call witnesses, produce evidence, and be heard in 
was “called a court and its decisions called judgments” did not change the character of the Court of 
Claims, which did not possess “judicial power in the sense in which those words are used in the 
Constitution”); id. at 704 (“[The Supreme] Court has no jurisdiction in any case where it cannot render 
judgment in the legal sense of the term, and when it depends upon the legislature to carry its opinion 
into effect or not, at the pleasure of Congress.”). 
194 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 48 (“The powers conferred by these acts of Congress upon the judge as 
well as the Secretary, are, it is true, judicial in their nature. For judgment and discretion must be 
exercised by both of them. But it is nothing more than the power ordinarily given by law to a 
commissioner appointed to adjust claims to lands or money under a treaty . . . .”). 
195 “Public rights are those that belong to the body politic,” while private rights belong to discrete 
individuals. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 693 (2004). For example, disposing of public lands is a matter of public right, 
and the Land Office’s grant of a land patent could be difficult to attack in actions between private 
parties. See Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 577 (2007) 
(indicating that state and federal courts would have to accept certain land office determinations in later 
litigation); id. at 578 (noting that a claim that the United States did not own the land it had granted 
would not be foreclosed); see also Woolhandler & Nelson, supra, at 705–06 (noting limitations on 
allowing private parties to enforce limits on alien landholding, although the government could raise 
such claims).  
 Public acts embodying status determinations such as marriage may also be substantially insulated 
from collateral attacks. Cf. V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1021–22 (2016) (adoption decree was entitled 
to full faith and credit). Status determinations are sometimes treated as in rem. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.7, at 633 (1964) (“[C]ourts often reify status and give it a fictional situs.”). 
196 Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 236–37 (1912). 
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opposition to the granting of naturalization. No such provision was contained 
in the act as it formerly stood.197 
Citizenship petitions, nevertheless, are Pfander and Birk’s strongest 
example of non-contentious jurisdiction. The Court referred to the 
determinations as judicial, and the matters were not easily characterized as 
commissioner work, at least if one assumes commissioner work had to be 
assigned to judges instead of courts.198 The Court’s upholding the practice 
under Article III, however, was only after the 1906 Act bolstered notice 
and opportunity to be heard for the government. Overall, one would be 
inclined to join other scholars in treating the practice as an outlier.199 
CONCLUSION 
Pfander and Birk have contributed to the appreciation of the many ex 
parte matters performed by the federal courts. Their examples of in rem-
type proceedings and warrants, however, present a need to make conclusive 
determinations of adverse legal interests that cannot readily be adjusted by 
voluntary extrajudicial action. Such notice as procedural due process 
required was provided, generally giving opportunities for adverse 
argument. In addition, the cases involving collusion reinforce a need for 
adverse interests by prohibiting merits collusion but countenancing some 
forms of jurisdictional collusion so long as the parties’ genuine adverse 
interests would be affected. Adverse interests are more attenuated for 
pension determinations, but the federal judges objected to such work as 
inconsistent with Article III, and the evidence does not support reading 
those objections as limited to political branch review. Naturalization is the 
authors’ strongest precedent, but the Court only explicitly approved the 
courts’ performing naturalization determinations under Article III after 
Congress provided for notice and opportunity to be heard by the 
government. The case, therefore, has not been made for reconceptualizing 
the adversity requirement for Article III cases. 
197 Id. at 236–37. The 1906 Act expressly gave the government power to seek such revocation, and 
the question in Johannessen was whether the United States could seek revocation even with respect to a 
pre-1906 grant of citizenship. Id. at 232. The particular grant had been made by a state court. Id. The 
Court held that the United States was not foreclosed from seeking revocation: “Sound reason, as we 
think, constrains us to deny to a certificate of naturalization, procured ex parte in the ordinary way, any 
conclusive effect as against the public.” Id. at 238.  
198 But cf. Wheeler, supra note 78, at 134 (treating the citizenship petitions as not involving cases 
or controversies). 
199 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 139, at 86 (“When, if ever, should a deep historical pedigree 
sustain a practice if the Court would otherwise find it unconstitutional?”); Morley, supra note 7, at 668–
69 (treating naturalization proceedings as an anomaly that may have been influenced by historic 
practice). 
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